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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING BELOW 
This matter comes directly to the Court on a "petition 
for review" filed by the National Parks and Conservation 
Association ("NPCA"), under Rule 14 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. NPCA seeks review of informal 
administrative actions by the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry ("Division") in connection with an exchange of a 
section of state school trust lands with Garfield County. 
NPCA asserts jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii). Respondents oppose this assertion of 
original jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES1 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether this Court has initial, original 
jurisdiction over the Board and Division pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii). 
2. Whether NPCA lacks standing. 
3. Whether the exchange of school lands was consistent 
with the terms and duties of the land grant trust. 
4. Whether the exchange was consistent with applicable 
statutes, rules and policies. 
5. Whether the Division's approval of this exchange 
was a proper exercise of agency power and met any applicable 
procedural requirements. 
6. Whether the Division properly responded to NPCA's 
requests for intervention, to delay action and for declaratory 
rulings. 
7. Whether the Board exceeded its statutory role. 
In accord with R. Utah S.Ct. 24(b), Respondents include their 
own statement of issues because they are dissatisfied with NPCA's 
statement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter concerns an exchange between the Division 
of State Lands and Forestry ("Division" or "Director") and 
Garfield County of a section of state school trust lands, and 
Division responses to requests from NPCA styled as a "petition 
for intervention or to otherwise participate", a request for 
declaratory rulings and a request to defer action. 
A. THE GARFIELD COUNTY EXCHANGE 
1. The School Trust Land Section 
On April 23, 1987, Garfield County made application to 
the Division for the exchange of State land pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 65-1-70 (1973, repealed and reenacted 1987 as 
Section 65A-7-7, effective July 1, 1988). 
(R. 5) 
Garfield County proposed in the application the 
exchange of school trust land described as Section 16, T. 34 S., 
R. 8 E., located in Garfield County and within the exterior 
boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park (referred to 
as "the Switchbacks Section" due to its primary physical 
feature). (R.7-9) The Switchbacks Section is one of almost 
NPCA's Statement of the Case, and its entire brief, is riddled 
with assertions of fact that are one-sided, take quotes out of 
context, argumentative and unsupported by reference to documents 
in the record. Improper and inadequately referenced factual 
assertions are normally disregarded and have been held by this 
Court to be grounds for affirmation. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. 
Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985)(assertions must be cited to 
record; blanket citations prohibited); Hobbs v. Denver and Rio 
Grande Western R.R., 677 P. 2d 1128 (Utah 1984)(failure to 
evenhandedly cite record resulted in affirmation). 
thirty school sections acquired prior to the creation of Capitol 
Reef National Park and treated as a valid existing right in the 
Capitol Reef Enabling Act. 16 U.S.C.A. S 273a (1974).3 
Contrary to NPCA's assertions on pages 9 and 10 of 
its "Statement of the Facts", the Switchbacks Section is not 
involved in a wilderness designation. More importantly, the 
1974 "Wilderness Recommendation", quoted by NPCA as describing 
the Switchbacks Section in particular, is over a decade out of 
4 
date. The new July 1987 "Statement for Management" for Capitol 
Reef classifies the school section as a "private development 
subzone" and states that: "the NPS can exercise little formal 
control over these lands" and that "the State is also limited in 
its ability to manage these school sections." The National Park 
Service also plans to develop this portion of the park involving 
the section. 
16 U.S.C. S 273a provides in part: "lands or 
interests therein owned by the State of Utah, or any political 
subdivision thereof, may be acquired only with the approval of 
such State or political subdivision." 
4 
The 1974 Wilderness Recommendation was attached as 
an appendix to NPCA's "Motion to Supplement Administrative 
Record" that was filed with their brief. The motion was denied. 
Statement for Management, Capitol Reef National 
Park, July 1987, pages 28, 49 and attached map attached as 
Appendix B to Addendum for this brief. Also in Appendix B is the 
Final Environmental Impact Statement, "Statement of Findings" for 
Capitol Reef National Park's General Management Plan. In the 
Plan's Summary, pages iii and iv, the Plan outlines the general 
development planned for the South District, which covers the 
Switchbacks Section, to include "a ranger station, a campground, 
utility and employee housing areas and a new road", with only 
"minor effects on the socioeconomic environment". 
-3-
2. Initial Agency Actions 
a. RDCC Planning and Environmental Review 
The proposed exchange was initially processed and 
submitted to the State Planning Coordinator and the Areawide 
Clearinghouse on a notice of State action dated July 8, 1987 with 
comments due August 17, 1987. 
Through the Resource Development and Coordinating 
Committee process, comments are received from the 16 state 
agencies and the public on state actions affecting the state's 
environment or physical resources. Utah Code Ann. § 63--28a-l to 
7 (1981); Utah Admin. Rule R675-1-3-H (1987). 
b. RDCC Comments 
The Five-County Association of Governments provided 
comments on the proposed exchange on August 13, 1987. Other 
comments arising from the RDCC process were received from state 
and federal agencies and members of the public on August 21, 
1987, in a letter from the State Planning Coordinator to the 
Division. (R. 35 and 48) These comments were discussed in a 
Division written analysis. (R. 25-26, 38, 48-50) 
Comments from NPCA were provided by letter to the 
Director dated September 7f 1987. (R. 39-41) 
3. The September Board Meeting 
On September 4f 1987, the agenda for the upcoming 
meeting of the Board of State Lands and Forestry was circulated 
to anyone on a standing mailing list and also provided in a news 
release to all newspapers and media of general circulation 
-4-
pursuant to the Utah Open Meetings Act. 
The meeting of the Board of State Lands and Forestry 
was convened on September 11, 1987. (R. 42) At that meeting, 
the Division presented a revised analysis of the exchange 
proposal, which was based on an earlier, July 27, 1987 working 
draft. (R. 31-36, 43-49) The Division written analysis 
included: (1) an analysis of the appraisals (R. 31, 44); (2) an 
economic potential comparison (R. 32, 44); (3) a "hold/sale" 
analysis (R. 32, 45); (4) an analysis of the exchange in terms of 
trust duties (R. 33-34, 45-47); (5) review of the Bangerter/Hodel 
o 
MOU and other potential transactions (R. 34, 47-48); (6) a 
discussion of RDCC comments, including those of NPCA (R. 48, 50); 
a summary of the notification process (R. 36,); and an analysis 
9 
of the policy implications of an exchange (R. 36). 
u
 Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-6(3)(a) (1977, amended 1978) 
only provides that: "public notice shall be satisfied by: (a) 
Posting written notice.... and (b) Providing notice to at least 
one newspaper of general circulation within the geographical 
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media 
correspondent." 
7 
Although the Division memorandum in the 
administrative record is erroneously dated July 27, 1987 from an 
earlier draft, it was not prepared in final form until the Board 
meeting. As the analysis is also reported in full in the Board 
minutes (attached), both record references have been provided. 
o 
The Division Director reported at the Board meeting 
that Governor Bangerter had contacted Secretary of the Interior 
Hodel and that Hodel "saw no policy conflict with this proposal". 
(R. 49) 
o 
NPCA quotes this Division policy analysis as support 
for the assertion in its Brief at page 13 that the Division 
"repeatedly acknowledged conflict with prior policy". This is 
another example of NPCA's taking a quote out of context. The 
paragraph concludes: "This recommended action is consistent with 
that policy". 
-5-
The Board and Division also heard comments from various 
interested parties and discussed alternatives suggested by the 
Division and public comment, including comment from Terri Martin 
on behalf of NPCA. (R. 52-53) Ms. Martin submitted a six-page 
letter and summarized six concerns, including (1) harm to the 
Park's scenic and natural values, (2) adverse impact on the MOU, 
(3) appraisal problems, (4) Board authority and policy and (5) 
adequacy of notice. (R. 52-53) 
The Director noted that the Division was faced with the 
basic question of whether the exchange application offered by 
Garfield County was consistent with trust obligations in the best 
interest of the school trust beneficiaries—not Garfield County 
or park visitors. (R. 49) Individual Board members asked 
questions of various persons making statements at the Board 
Meeting and made statements of their individual perspectives and 
concerns. (R. 49-54) 
After discussing five alternatives, including deferring 
action, the Director recommended that the Board move to approve 
the "concept of an exchange subject to further evaluation to 
assure there is a benefit to be realized from the County 
exchange". (R. 48 and 49) After the discussion of these items, 
the Board approved the Division's recommendation. (R. 54) 
1. Division's Administrative Actions on the Exchange 
The Division Staff reviewed appraisals for each of the 
two parcels of land initially offered by Garfield County and 
concluded that the appraisals reflected the value of the land. 
-6-
(R. 59-60 and R. 72.) The Division reviewed the likelihood of 
economic benefit from the exchange (R. 59-60) and the rules 
governing trust land management in order to be "fully aware of 
the alternatives and for managing trust lands and the 
consequences of those alternatives." (R. 5|8) 
After these analyses, the Division concluded that the 
lands offered by Garfield County were insufficient to satisfy 
Division trust management objectives and sb informed Garfield 
County. (R. 73) The Division advised Garfield County that the 
County had the alternative of offering additional land value and 
that the Division was in the process of considering issues raised 
in NPCA's request for declaratory rulings. (R. 72-73) 
The Division Director sent a December 2, 1987 status 
report to the Board wherein he concluded that the Board's 
"conceptual" approval reflects the Board's judgment that an 
economically advantageous exchange is "consistent with sound 
policy", and that in light of the Board's role would not be 
involved in "administrative or executive functions such as the 
execution of an exchange". (R. 92-93) 
After the Division's November 3# 1987 letter to 
Garfield County, Garfield County offered additional land as 
requested, that amounted to over 150% of ^he value of the 
Switchbacks Section . (R. 89) Division Staff reviewed the 
The value of the Switchbacks Section was appraised at $65,000 
and the Garfield County property was appraised at $98,000. The 
Division recognized that any exchange with the federal government 
is restricted to equal value by the Federal Land Policy 
Management Act. (R. 47) 
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appraisal of the offered land and concluded that it met generally 
accepted appraisal standards. (R. 89) The Director approved the 
exchange on December 21, 1987. (R. 89) 
A press release announcing the approval of the exchange 
was issued, accompanied by a three-page, single-spaced "Statement 
on the Exchange of Land". (R. 94-97) This Statement describes 
the Director's rationale for his decision and contains his 
findings and conclusions. The patent for the Switchbacks Section 
was signed by the Governor on December 24, 1987. 
B. DIVISION RESPONSES TO THE NPCA REQUESTS 
1. Division Response to NPCA's Request to 
"Intervene or Otherwise Participate" 
On October 14, 1987, NPCA sent a letter requesting "the 
right to intervene or otherwise participate" in the exchange 
process. (R. 61) On November 16, 1987, in reply to NPCA's 
request, the Division advised NPCA that it had "no procedures 
under which a request for intervention in the consideration of 
an exchange proposal might be granted" and an exchange was not 
"viewed as an adjudicative action under current law." (R. 74, 
75) The Division also concluded that there was "no basis for 
interjection of a third party into such a negotiation process." 
(R. 74, 75) 
While the Division did not formally grant intervention, 
NPCA was notified that the Division would "welcome any 
information related to the value of affected properties or any 
alternative which you may have to offer". (R. 74, 75) NPCA was 
- f t -
"urged to provide such information as soon as possible". 
(R. 74, 75) 
NPCA sent the Division a letter dated December 18, 
1987 that reiterated their prior legal arguments and requested 
that they be "provided responses to the declaratory rulings, with 
reasonable opportunity thereafter to proffer factual submissions 
or legal argument in opposition to the exchange." (R. 77) 
This letter was not received by the Division until three days 
after the exchange had been approved. (R. 91) 
2. Petition for Declaratory Rulings 
Also on October 14, 1987, NPCA sent a letter to the 
Division which requested that the Board or the Director render 
nine declaratory rulings. (R. 65 and R. 71) On December 21, 
1987, the Director responded to the request for declaratory 
rulings, in accordance with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46A-15 and R632-7-1. The Director advised NPCA that the 
declaratory ruling statute and implementing rules contemplated 
an adjudicative process, and that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46a-3(8)(a), declaratory ruling requests could not be used 
to "inhibit agency discretion". (R. 83) . 
The Director further advised NPCA that declaratory 
rulings could not be used as an alternative to rulemaking or for 
general applicability. (R. 83) He further advised NPCA that 
they had provided inadequate information under the terms of 
The December 18, 1987 letter sets forth almost identical, 
purely legal arguments as in earlier submittals. (R. 39-41, 52-
53, 66-71) 
Division Rule R632-7 to enable a ruling on six of the requests, 
but "would be pleased to entertain any additional requests which 
provide adequate information" or "respond in a non-adjudicative 
setting to any questions." (R. 84) The Director found that the 
8th and 9th requests provided by NPCA did not identify "statutes, 
rules, or orders as required by statute and rules." Further, the 
Director advised NPCA of the apparent mischaracterization by NPCA 
of certain Division documents as current authoritative statements 
of policy. (R. 84) 
The Director did issue a ruling on the applicability of 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14, pertaining to NPCA's 7th request, i.e., 
whether the Division can give "preference to the protection of 
significant scenic, aesthetic and recreational values where such 
decisions may foreclose or reduce prospects for greater monetary 
returns from a different decision." (R. 71, 84) The Director 
summarized his ruling as follows: 
In summary, the State has a duty as trustee 
to manage and dispose of lands for the 
benefit of the public school system. To 
the extent that preservation of non-
economic values does not constitute a 
diversion of trust assets or resources, 
such an activity may be prudently 
undertaken. To the extent that there exist 
several options for dealing with trust 
property and the protection of non-economic 
values is necessary for maximizing the 
economic value of the property, such 
protection may be prudently undertaken. 
When such preservation or protection 
results in a diversion of assets or loss of 
economic opportunity, a breach of duty is 
indicated. The provisions of Section 65-1-
14 must be read accordingly. 
(R. 87) The Director observed to NPCA that the ruling would be 
of limited scope due to the level of information provided by the 
request. (R. 84 and R. 85.) NPCA did not provide any additional 
information or make any other inquiry concerning the rulings. 
NPCA filed its "Petition for Review" with this Court on 
January 28, 1988. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The NPCA "Petition for Review" and Brief places before 
the Court issues requiring construction of the Utah Enabling Act, 
the Utah Constitution and a variety of statutes and rules, most 
of which involve the administration of state lands. Unless the 
issue before the Court involves a "pure question of law", where 
an agency has been granted broad discretion and agency expertise 
is involved, this Court grants deference to the agency's 
interpretation and application. Adkins v. Division of State 
Lands, 719 P.2d 524# 526 (Utah 1986); citing Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Department of Employment Security/ 657 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1982). 
In particular, matters involving the disposition of 
school trust lands have been accorded special treatment on 
review. Numerous state court decisions and several United States 
Supreme Court decisions have reviewed trust land transactions 
with special deference in view of the trust. See, e.g., Alamo 
Land and Cattle Co. v. Arizonay 424 U.S. 295 (1976); Duchesne 
County v. State Tax Comm'n., 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943); 
Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (CD. Utah 1979); Kadish v. 
Arizona State Land Dept., 155 Ariz. 484, 747 P.2d 1183 (1987). 
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In cases of construction of the law for trust lands, 
the Arizona Supreme Court found that "in dealing with trust lands 
in particular, all doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting 
and preserving trust purposes". 155 Ariz, at 494, 747 P.2d at 
1194. 
Since the Board and Division of State Lands and 
Forestry administer millions of acres of surface and minerals in 
trust for specified beneficiaries, they have been granted broad 
discretion with regard to the negotiation and execution of 
property transactions. See e.g., Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 
P. 534 (1900); Whitmore v. Candland, 47 Utah 77, 151 P. 528 
(1915); Hamblin v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 
402, 187 P. 178 (1919); McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 
238, 381 P.2d 786 (1963); Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 
Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). Due to this broad grant of 
management discretion, it has been held that: 
The whole matter of making disposition 
of the state's lands was placed in the 
hands and under the control of the state 
land board. No right of appeal to the 
courts, or of reviewing the board's 
actions otherwise by the courts, except 
where lack or excess of power is 
alleged, has been given. All the courts 
can do, therefore, is to inquire into 
and determine in a proper proceeding 
whether the board has acted without or 
in excess of its powers or jurisdiction. 
Courts may not review the conduct of the 
board, for the purpose of correcting 
mere irregularities. 
Whitmore v. Candland, 47 Utah 77, 88, 151 P. 528, 535 (1915); 
quoted by, McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 245, 381 
i o_ 
P.2d 726, 730 (1963)• After Adkins, it is apparent that the 
Court's recognition of a grant of Board discretion would apply 
equally to the Division. Adkins at 527. 
When the law governing the trust is construed and 
applied to a question of land disposition, the law must be 
harmonized with carrying out the responsibility of administering 
trust lands "in the most prudent and profitable manner possible". 
Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 18, 403 P.2d 
781, 785 (1965)(emphasis added). 
In sum, the broad grant of authority to the Board and 
Division, the agency's special expertise as trustee, and the 
mandate of the trust act together to curb review of this matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS] 
1. The Court lacks jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (3)(e)(iii) over the Division and Board because § 78-2-2 
(3)(e)(iii) makes no reference to the Division and only refers to 
"appellate" jurisdiction over Board "final orders" in a "formal 
adjudicative proceeding". There was no "formal adjudicative 
proceeding" by the Board or Division, no Board final order, and 
no authority for the Board to adjudicate and render a final 
order. 
2. NPCA lacks standing under this Court's standards 
set forth in Terracor, and in particular has failed to properly 
allege particularized injury arising from protected interests in 
the state section. NPCA's allegations are speculative, 
hypothetical and merely a generalized attack on government. 
-13-
Other parties have a greater interest in this matter, such as the 
federal government and trust beneficiaries, and no issues of 
great public import flow from this exchange. 
3. The terms and duties of the trust, as established 
in the Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution, require that both 
federal and state governments administer the trust, using 
standard trust law principles, to provide the greatest possible 
benefit for the school land grant trust, and not as public or 
national park lands. Review of issues involving the trust is 
limited by the deference accorded the trust, and the Board and 
Division's broad discretion and expertise. 
4. The exchange was consistent with the obligations 
and purposes of the trust and any applicable federal and state 
statutes and policies, and was a proper exercise of 
administrative powers that comported with any applicable 
administrative procedures, including an adequate written basis 
for the Director's discretionary actions. The exchange statute 
and Division procedures did not provide for a formal or informal 
adjudicative process. 
5. The Director responded to NPCA's "procedural" 
requests appropriately. The requests for intervention and to 
defer action lacked any procedural basis, was unauthorized and 
prohibited by administrative procedures. The request to defer 
action was untimely. Any requests for declaratory rulings not 
responded to were as a result of NPCA's failure to conform to 
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statutory requirements. NPCA "procedural" assertions do not 
provide for the relief sought in their petition. 
6. NPCA was provided the notice required by law and 
also had actual notice. The record shows NPCA's substantial 
participation and an opportunity for informal input throughout 
the exchange process. 
7. The Board did not exceed its statutory authority 
by allowing public input at its meeting on the exchange proposal. 
All administrative actions were performed by the Division. Any 
Board input was consistent with their policy-making role and 
duty to "advise" the Director under Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14. 
Alternatively, any Board involvement would have been harmless 
and "mere surplusage". 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
NPCA brought this matter directly to this Court from 
the Division of State Lands and Forestry as a Rule 14, R. Utah 
S. Ct. "petition for review" and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii)(1988). 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is 
established by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) 
provides in part that: The Supreme Court has "appellate 
jurisdiction" over "final orders and decrees in formal 
adjudicative proceedings originating with....the Board of State 
Lands...." (Emphasis added). Subsection (3)(f) provides 
"appellate jurisdiction" over "final orders and decrees of the 
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district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
12 
agencies under Subsection (e)...." 
On its face, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) does not 
provide any direct jurisdiction in this Court over the Division, 
and only provides appellate jurisdiction over the Board final 
orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings. 
NPCA has only asked the Court to review Division final 
actions and decisions, and restricted its requested relief to the 
Division (i.e., rescision of a patent issued by the Division). 
NPCA does not seek review of a Board final order and in fact 
recognizes that adjudication is generally beyond the Board's 
powers. (Brief of Petitioner at pages 1, 2, 24, 52 and 56). 
NPCA admits that it was the Division Director who "approved the 
exchange" (Brief of Petitioner at 2). 
Since this Court's decision in Adkins v. Board of State 
Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1986), it has been clear 
that the Division alone is authorized to make administrative 
decisions for the management and disposition of state lands. 
Thus, as matter of law, "final orders and decrees" cannot 
"originate" in the Board. As a matter of fact, no final order or 
The 1988 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 substituted 
"formal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in subsection 
(3)(e) and added subsection (3)(f), effective April 25, 1988. 
Utah Laws 1988, Ch. 248, S 4. The amendments appear designed to 
implement the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and to clear up 
ambiguity. The "formal adjudicative proceedings" language is an 
obvious legislative interpretation of § 78-2-2(3)(e) and would 
apply to this matter. Frank v. State, 613 P. 2d 517, 519 (Utah 
1980) (amendment to governmental immunity statute applied to 
pending action due to judicial policy to respect manifestation of 
legislative intent in amendment). 
n c 
13 decree did originate in the Board. 
Direct review of an order or decision of an 
administrative agency under Rule 14 is only allowed 
"[w]hen judicial review is provided by statute". Of the 
five state agencies listed in § 78-2-2(3)(e), only the 
Public Service Commission and the State Tax Commission have 
specific statutes providing direct review in the Utah Supreme 
Court. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 and § 59-24-2 (1987). 
The state land exchange statute itself, Utah 
Code Ann. § 65-1-70, contemplates only an informal, negotiated 
property transaction and provides no authority for a hearing 
or for judicial review. Although there is a statutory provision 
for state lands that provides for "de novo review in the district 
court" and judicial review in the Supreme Court, whether it has 
general application to all state lands matters is unclear. Utah 
13 
The Adkins case also points to a possible ambiguity in the 
reference to the Board in § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii). As explained in 
Adkins, Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-1 (enacted 1967) provides that a 
reference to the old "State Land Board" would be construed as 
"Division" unless a section in Title 65 related to policy-making, 
where it would be construed as "Board". However, § 78-2-2 is 
much more recent and does not require interpretation of the term 
"State Land Board". Even if the reference to the Board of State 
Lands in § 78-2-2 could be construed as meaning "Division", there 
was no formal adjudication by either the Board or Division. 
-17-
Code Ann. § 65-1-9(2)(1986, repealed 1988). * 
The Legislature's the use of the word "appellate" when 
describing the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court over agency 
actions, limits the direct review of this court to those matters 
where a formal, trial-type proceeding has generated an evidenti-
ary record, such as in formal agency adjudicative hearings or 
after review in the district court. Peatross v. Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P. 2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976) 
(defines appellate jurisdiction as on the record after hearing). 
This is consistent with the "formal adjudicatory proceeding" 
limitation in § 78-2-2(3) on direct Supreme Court review. 
Although the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
was not effective when the agency proceedings commenced, any 
confusion that may exist in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) has been 
cured for any future Division adjudicative actions. For purposes 
of judicial Review, the Act distinguishes between "informal 
adjudicative proceedings", for which there is de novo review by 
the district courts, and "formal adjudicative proceedings", for 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-9 has undergone recent amendment. 
Prior to the enactment of H.B. 100, the Judical Article 
Implementation Act of 1986, subsection (2) provided general 
adjudicatory authority for the Division. See, Adkins v. Board of 
State Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1986). The 
H.B. 100 amendment inserted the requirement of district court de 
novo review, but apparently limited it to hearings as to 
"preference rights" held under subsection (1) of § 65-1-9. 
Hopefully, the new 1988 Trust Land Management Act, Title 65A, has 
cured some possible confusion. With the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act also effective in 1988, there has been a complete 
overhaul of the administrative procedures for state lands. 
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which judicial review is in the Supreme Court or Court of 
Appeals, as provided by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
15(1)(a) and § 63-46b-16(l). Pursuant to Board rules, and as 
authorized in § 63-46b-5, any "adjudicative proceedings" which 
may arise in either the Board or the Division are initially 
designated as "informal". Utah Admin. Code R632-8-1 (effective 
January 1, 1988). 
Although matters originating in both the Public 
Service Commission and the Tax Commission may proceed directly 
to this Court, both are required specifically by law to have 
formal trial-type administrative proceedings. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-16 and § 59-24-2. In contrast, other agencies go to the 
district court for the creation of a record prior to appeal 
before either the Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme 
Court. See Erickson and Nelson, "To What Court Do I Appeal", 87 
Utah Lawyer Alert, No. 1, at 14-15 (January 15, 1987)(concludes 
that Board and Division actions go to District Court, then to the 
Supreme Court). 
Here, there were only very informal actions by the 
Division and a minimal "administrative record". Moreover, there 
are substantial factual disputes between the parties, as is 
apparent from the NPCA's sixteen page factual summary, their 283 
pages of "supplemental materials" (which the Court excluded from 
the record), and Respondent's motion to strike the brief for 
reliance on those non-record materials and other perceived 
liberties with the facts. (See Brief of Respondents, supra at 
footnote 2.) The parties' factual disputes, and the lack of any 
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formal hearingf forces this Court to review without an adequate 
record. 
Though amendments to the Judicial Article and the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act may cause some confusion with the 
Court's appellate jurisdiction, the one crystal clear conclusion 
that may be drawn is that there is no statutory authorization for 
direct appellate review by this Court of the informal Board and 
Division actions which NPCA has brought before the Court. 
Without this statutory basis for NPCA's petition, it must be 
dismissed. 
II. NPCA LACKS STANDING 
Every litigant must have standing as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite. In Terracor v. Board of State Lands and Forestry, 
716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986), the court considered whether Terracor, 
a firm which sought to exchange property with the Division of 
State Lands and Forestry, which later petitioned for extra-
ordinary relief, had standing. After considering the standards 
for determining whether a litigant has standing, the court 
concluded Terracor met none of the requirements and thus lacked 
standing. NPCA's assertion of standing is even more tenuous than 
that asserted by Terracor. 
The doctrine of standing assures "the procedural 
integrity of judicial adjudications" by limiting the courts to 
those "disputes most effectively resolved through the judicial 
process" and prohibits the use of the courts as an "open forum 
for the resolution of ideological disputes about the performance 
of government." Terracor# 716 P.2d at 799, citing, Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1969), Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 
(Utah 1983) and Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978). 
Terracor examined three bases for standing. First, the 
plaintiff must show that it suffered a "distinct and palpable 
injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the 
dispute." 716 P.2d at 799. Even if there is no standing under 
the first test, a party may still have standing if "no one else 
has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the issues 
are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff 
has standing to raise the issue". Lastly, a party may still have 
standing if the issues are unique and have great public import. 
Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799. Accord, Blodgett v. Zions First 
National Bank, 752 P. 2d 901 (Utah App. 1988). 
First, and most obvious, NPCA has alleged no "distinct 
and palpable injury". NPCA asserts that its interest in the 
park's "scenic, aesthetic and recreational" values suffered a 
distinct and palpable injury from the change of title alone and 
from the moment that the land changed hands. NPCA only alleges 
that its members use the park, not that they use the state school 
section. 
NPCA's allegations of injury are completely 
speculative, hypothetical, presumptive and premature. Injury 
for standing purposes cannot be presumed, and it is an unfounded 
presumption that Garfield County is less likely to manage the 
land consistent with park purposes, or to exchange with the 
IE 
National Park Service. 
The facts in Terracor are analogous in this matter. 
When the Division denied Terracor's exchange proposal and then 
leased the property to another party, Terracor challenged the 
leasing procedures under trust law. Like Terracor, because NPCA 
represents only park users, NPCA has no stake in the non-park 
state lands. Just because they wanted the state to exchange with 
the Park and a decision by the state to pretend the lands are 
park lands does not injure their interests in the park. 
As explained in Society of Professional Journalists 
v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987): "this Court saw 
Terracor's writ petition as nothing more than a generalized 
attack on the Board's mode of proceeding, an attack that could 
have been made equally well by anyone. Therefore, Terracor could 
show no adverse effect and was denied standing." Id. 
As to the second standing test, clearly there are 
other parties here with obviously greater interest. Although the 
federal government expressly signed-off on this exchange*, since 
the U.S. Department of Interior and the National Park Service are 
specifically empowered to enforce the laws and regulations 
relating to the Park, they are in a much better position to 
protect the Park than NPCA. In addition to these federal 
In fact, as will be explained in this brief, as a result of 
the obligations under the school trust and, because of the land's 
status as a "valid existing right", it may be more likely that 
the lands will be "preserved" in Garfield County's hands. 
parties, all parties identified in Terracor would also have 
an interest superior to NPCA (i.e., a party seeking a 
simultaneous exchange or other disposition of the same land, 
the trust beneficiaries, the State Treasurer and the Attorney 
General). 
The Terracor Court declined to reach the third 
test, whether the public importance of issues is so great 
that they should be litigated in any event, because there were 
other potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest. 
Terracor at 800, citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1151. 
Certainly that is the case here. Since the Terracor Court 
could identify others with a greater interest, particularly 
where school trust lands were involved, if the issues were of 
importance, those entities who clearly do have standing would 
have pressed the issues. 
It is obvious from NPCA's unfounded assertions on 
pages 11 and 12 of their brief that they believe this case is 
about the "continuing public dispute concerning Garfield County's 
efforts to pave the "Burr Trail", opposed by NPCA and other 
conservation organizations." Unless the standing restriction is 
imposed, NPCA will be able to "bootstrap" its political "Burr 
Trail" agenda into this proceeding, gain "inroad on the 
representative form of government" and convert the judiciary 
into an "open forum about the political and ideological disputes 
about the performance of government". Terracor at 799. 
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III. LAND GRANT TRUST LAW GOVERNS THE EXCHANGE OF THE 
SCHOOL LAND SECTION INVOLVED IN THIS DISPUTE 
A. The Historical Background Provides 
Essential Perspective 
Utah is one of thirty states whose Enabling Act granted 
lands for the support of schools and institutions. L. Mall, 
Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 (3d Ed. 1981). The purpose of 
the land grants was to place new states on an "equal footing" 
with the original states, which did not have large amounts of 
federal "public land" reserved in their borders that was immune 
from taxation. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559. 566-67 (1911); 
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). See also G.C. 
Coggins and C. Wilkinson, Federal Land and Resources Law 45,56 
(1981). As explained in the oft-quoted case of Utah v. Kleppe, 
586 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, Andrus v. 
Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 (1980): 
There were no federal lands within the 
borders of the original thirteen states when 
they adopted and rectified the United States 
Constitution. Thus, virtually all of the 
lands within their borders were subject to 
taxation, including taxation necessary for 
the maintenance of their public school 
systems. When other states were subsequently 
admitted into the Union, their territorial 
confines were "carved" from federal 
territories. The "public lands" owned and 
reserved by the United States within those 
territorial confines were not subject to 
taxation. This reservation by the United 
States created a serious impediment to the 
"public land" states in relation to an 
adequate property tax base necessary to 
permit these states to operate and maintain 
essential governmental services, including 
the public school systems. It was in order to 
"equalize" the status of the newly admitted 
states with that of the original thirteen 
*)A _ 
states, that Congress enacted the federal 
land grant statutes. The specific purpose 
was to create a binding permanent trust which 
would generate financial aid to support the 
public school systems of the "public land" states. 
Although a relatively large amount of land has been 
sold in Utah over the years, approximately 3.7 million acres 
remain unsold. Despite this lack of success in land sales, even 
a cursory review of the Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution 
will reveal that the whole reason that the lands were granted was 
so that they could be sold, placed on the tax rolls, and have the 
proceeds create a permanent fund. See, e.g., Duchesne County v. 
State Tax Comm'n., 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335, (1943); Jensen v. 
Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32, 33-34 (Utah 1982). 
As each new state's enabling act was drafted, each 
state "bargained" for the lands to be granted, and in turn agreed 
to provisions in its constitution to protect the trust. Courts 
have variously called this bargain a "solemn agreement," Andrus 
v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 (1980), an "irrevocable compact," 
Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 235 (Okla. 1982) or, 
most often, the "bilateral compact," Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 
995 (CD. Utah 1979). The consequence of the "bilateral compact" 
is that the trust is as binding on the federal government as it 
is on the states, even for school lands within federal enclaves 
such as national parks. 
As more states gained admittance into the Union, the 
land grants gradually became more generous, varying widely in 
purpose and acreage until 77 million acres for public schoolsf 
21 million acres for higher education and a grand total of 
319,759,585 acres have been granted to the 30 public 
land states for the various purposes enumerated in their 
respective enabling acts. Public Land Law Review Comm'n, 
One-Third of the Nation's Land, 243 (1970). 
As the land grants became more generous, however, 
the constraints on the new state's subsequent disposition of 
the lands and its proceeds became more explicit and restrictive. 
This was explained by the United States Supreme Court in the 
landmark case of Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967), as a 
congressional reaction to "repeated violations of a similar 
grant" which "consisted of private sales at unreasonably low 
prices." Id. at 464. See United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land 
in Ferry County, Wash., 293 Fed. Supp. 1042, 1047, (E.D. Wash. 
1968) and cases cited therein. See also S. Rep. 414, 53 Cong. 2d 
Sess. (1894); H. Rep. 162 and 2337, 52d Cong. 2d Session (1893) 
(Senate and House reports on Utah's Enabling Act and the intent 
of the trust restrictions). 
Therefore, as Utah, like other land grant states, 
succeeded to a large share of the lands within the states, it did 
so by agreement with the federal government as to the terms and 
restrictions on the lands via the Utah Enabling Act (hereinafter 
"Act") and the Utah Constitution. Act of July 16, 1894, Ch,. 
138. 28 Stat. 107. It is the terms and restrictions of the land 
grants as set forth in the Enabling Acts, and the acceptance of 
or 
the lands upon those conditions in the state constitutions, that 
give rise to the trust responsibilities recognized by state and 
federal courts. 
B. The Creation of the Land Grant Trust in the 
Utah Enabling Act Establishes the Trust Terms 
The Utah Enabling Act granted four sections of land in 
each township, and other lands "in lieu" of sections already 
subject to a federal or private entry, "for the support of the 
common schools...." Act, Section 6. The Act also grants 
various quantities of acres for the benefit of eleven other 
institutions to be "held, appropriated, and disposed of exclu-
sively for the purposes herein mentioned, in such manner as the 
legislature of the State may provide." Act at Sections 8 and 10 
(emphasis added). 
In addition, the Act requires that certain proceeds 
of the land grants be placed in permanent funds. Section 10 
of the Act "imposed the specific conditions on the use and 
disposition of the school land grant" contained in Section 6. 
Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32, 33 (Utah 1982). Section 8 of 
the Act requires that the proceeds of the grants to higher 
education "constitute permanent funds, to be safely invested 
and held by said State; and the income to be used exclusively 
for the purposes of such university and agricultural college, 
respectively." 
The Enabling Act provisions amount to a "declaration 
of trust" under standard, common-law principles of trust law. 
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The trust was created when Utah accepted the grants, in its 
constitution, on the conditions set forth in the Utah Enabling 
Act. 
C The Acceptance of the Trust In the 
Utah Constitution Binds the State 
to the Terms and Duties of the Trust 
The Constitution of Utah, Article XX, Section 1 
provides: 
All lands of the State 
that have been or may hereafter 
be granted to the State by 
Congress...are hereby accepted, 
and declared to be public lands 
of the State; and shall be held 
in trust by the people, to be 
disposed of as may be provided 
by laws, for the respective 
purposes, for which they have 
been or may be granted. 
(Emphasis added). 
Based on these provisions in the Utah Enabling Act 
nd Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a 
trust had been created and applied standard trust law principles. 
Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n., 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335, 
(1943). The Duchesne Court found that this grant "embraces all 
elements of an express trust, with the state as trustee, holding 
title only for the purposes of executing the trust; and is made 
guarantor of the trust estate against loss." Id, at 371, 140 P.2d 
at 338. The Court further explained that all elements of a trust 
were present because the "trust estate is definite, the trustee is 
_OQ_ 
certain, the purposes of the trust and the use of the fund is 
definite, certain and particularly characterized." Ixi. at 371, 
140 P.2d at 338. See also Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32, 33 
(Utah 1982). 
Although Section 1 of Article XX of our Constitution 
tells us that the lands are accepted in trust, to be disposed of 
according to law and the purposes for which they were granted, it 
also says that they are "declared to be public lands of the 
state". The Education Article, Article X, Sections 5 and 7 of the 
Utah Constitution provides that the proceeds of the land grants 
are permanent funds to be guaranteed against "loss or 
diversion." The Jensen v. Dinehart Court considered the 
"conditions and obligations of the grant of federal lands" to be 
accepted in the provisions of this Article. 645 P.2d at 33. 
D. The Exchange of State Lands 
Was Consistent With the Terms and 
Duties Imposed by the Trust 
1. A Two-Step Analysis is Applied 
To Administration of Trust Lands 
Since the landmark United States Supreme Court case of 
Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967), courts have applied 
essentially a two-step process to issues involving the land grant 
trust. Initially, the courts analyze the nature of the trust and 
Article X, was amended at the November 4, 1986 general 
election, effective July 1, 1987, as proposed by Senate Joint 
Resolution No.l, Laws 1986 (2nd Special Session.) Section 3 was 
revised and renumbered as Section 5 and Section 5 was renumbered 
as Section 7. 
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duties it demands. Nextf courts examine the methods that the 
state legislatures or agencies use to administer trust lands under 
their charge to find whether the methods comport with the duties 
imposed by the trust. This same approach may be applied to the 
questions posed by NPCA. This will require an analysis of the 
Utah trust and the duties it imposes, as well as an examination 
of relevant state land statutes# rules and policies. 
In Lassen v. Arizona/ the Court considered a plan to 
allow state school lands to be used by the Arizona Department of 
Transportation without actual compensation being paid for the 
lands. The state argued, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed, 
that the trust need not be compensated for the highway 
department's use of state lands for public roads because the 
building of highways necessarily enhances the lands. The United 
States Supreme Court disagreed and found that the grants to the 
states for the various purposes set forth in the state enabling 
act established a trust and that the "trust will be protected, 
and its purpose will be entirely satisfied, if the State is 
required to provide full compensation for the land it uses." 
Lassen at 465. 
The Lassen case is cited by other federal and state 
courts as they consider issues involving the trust because the 
rationale for the decision is that the land grants to the states 
exhibit a general congressional policy for the protection of trust 
beneficiaries and an adherence to the "bilateral compact." 
Moreover, the Court intended its decision to apply to the 
disposition of trust land grants generally, although the terms of 
the grants differ among the states. Lassen at 460. 
Briefs were filed before the Court by nine western states, 
including Utah. The Court stated that it decided to hear the 
case "because of the importance of the issues presented both 
to the United States and to the States which have received such 
lands." 385 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). Thus, it is quite 
proper for other courts to turn to Lassen for their own decisions, 
even though they must consider different enabling acts and 
different dispositions of trust lands. 
The United States Supreme Court extended this rule 
in Alamo Land and Cattle v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976). Relying 
on Lassen and the earlier Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 
(1919)(state plan to use trust lands for tourism invalidated), 
the Alamo Court ruled that the state's enabling act and the cases 
require that "the trust is to receive, at the time of its 
disposition of any interest in the land, the then full value of 
the particular interest which is being dispensed." Alamo at 303 
(emphasis added). Like the Lassen case, the Alamo Court 
recognized that the enabling act's constraints on trust lands 
"indicate Congress's concern that the grants provide the most 
substantial support possible to the beneficiaries to derive the 
full benefit of the grant." Alamo at 302. (Emphasis added). 
2. The Trust Terms Mandate No Particular 
Administrative Procedures for the 
Management or Disposition of Trust Lands 
The Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution do not 
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provide any particular administrative procedures for school trust 
land. If there is any "litmus test" applied by the courts as to 
trust administration, it is whether the act was consistent with 
standard, common-law trust principles. 
When the Lassen Court considered the procedures that 
should be used by the state when faced with possible questions of 
management and disposition of trust lands, the Court held that the 
state "may employ the procedures established by the Commissioner's 
rules, or any other procedures reasonably calculated to insure the 
integrity of the trust and to prevent misapplication of its lands 
and funds." (Emphasis added). Lassen at 465; Alamo Land & Cattle 
Co. at 301. Any restrictions in the enabling acts generally 
required only "prudent management ...to preserve the usefulness 
of the grants for their intended purposes." Lassen at 468. 
3. Standard Trust Law Principles Apply 
To Administration Of Trust Lands 
In Utah, as in other land grant states, standard 
trust law principles have been applied to issues of trust 
administration. Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission, 104 Utah 
365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943). As explained in the case of Coleman v. 
Utah State Land Board, 17 Ut. 2d 14, 403 P.2d 781 (1965) the state 
as trustee is charged with managing state lands "in the most 
prudent and profitable manner possible." 17 Ut. 2d at 18, 403 
P.2d at 792. (Emphasis added). 
In addition to the overall duty a trustee has of acting 
with prudence, a trustee also has a duty to make the property 
productive, and a duty of "undivided loyalty". See, Bogart, Law 
of Trusts, Ch. 9-13, 4th Ed. (1963). 
A classic restatement of the duty of loyalty is from 
Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 
(1928): 
A trustee is held to something stricter 
that the morals of the marketplace. Not 
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior....Uncompromising 
rigidity has been the attitude of the 
courts of equity when petitioned to 
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty 
by the "disintegrating erosion" of 
particular exceptions. 
In Ebke v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds, 154 
Neb. 244, 47 N.W. 2d 520 (1951), the Court held that because the 
"school lands are trust property and the state is required to 
administer as such...his undivided loyalty and good faith, and all 
his acts must be in the interest of the cestui que trust and no 
one else." Ebke at 247, 47 N.W. 2d at 522-523. Moreover, since 
the state's "status as trustee is fixed by the Constitution, a 
violation of its duty as a trustee is a violation of the 
Constitution itself." Id. 
Since the beneficiary of the school land grant trust is 
the public schools, it would violate the duty of loyalty to divert 
the benefit of the trust to any other interest, no matter how 
"scenic, aesthetic or recreational". 
4. The Exchange Promoted Trust Purposes 
And Provided Substantial Benefits to 
The School Land Grant Trust 
When the exchange was finally approved by the Director, 
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almost eight months after Garfield County's application, the 
school trust received over 150% of the value of the traded lands. 
The state received a parcel of land by the Garfield County Airport 
and land in the Richfield City Industrial Park. (R. 89) While 
the Switchbacks Section had produced virtually no income since 
the creation of Capitol Reef National Park, and was consuming 
administrative expenses, both parcels are income producing and 
marketable. 
The National Park Service recognizes that while the 
"State is also limited in its ability to manage these sections", 
it "would be extremely difficult to put together one exchange 
package under the regular FLPMA (Federal Land Policy Management 
Act of 1976) exchange procedures." (Addendum, Appendix B). 
However, due to the express approval of Secretary Hodel, the 
exchange will have no adverse impact on any other state/federal 
exchange. 
By acquiring lands that are manifestly more valuable 
and manageable, the Division acted in the best interest of the 
school trust beneficiaries. Rejection of these benefits, in order 
to promote NPCA's alleged scenic, aesthetic and recreational 
interests, would be a breach of the school trust. 
E. Federal Statutory Law Does Not Abrogate 
the Obligations Imposed by the Trust 
NPCA asserted in its brief that "statutory polices 
and other trust obligations provide for the protection of the 
significant scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of the 
Capitol Reef Section". In support of this, NPCA cites the Capitol 
Reef Enabling Act. Brief of Petitioner at 35-36. However, NPCA 
failed to cite a case that directly contradicts this assertion, 
and ignored Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (CD. Utah 1979). 
In Utah v. Andrusf a Utah federal district court 
applied state trust law to hold that the State of Utah and its 
lessee had a right of reasonable access to school trust lands 
within a federal Wilderness Study Area in order to allow "full 
economic development" of the lands for the trust beneficiaries. 
Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, (CD. Utah 1979) (Emphasis 
added). While the Court also found that federal statutes and 
rules required the Bureau of Land Management to prevent impairment 
of wilderness characteristics and degradation of the environment, 
the Court concluded that due to the bilateral compact and purpose 
of the trust the federal government could not prohibit full 
economic development. Ld. at 1010. 
Not only is the level of protection of a National Park 
statutorily more liberal than Wilderness Study Areas, there is 
nothing in the Capitol Reef Enabling Act that mentions state lands 
except the provision defining their status as "valid existing 
rights", not subject to federal acquisition. 16 U.S.C § 273a 
(1974). This no doubt explains why the Capitol Reef "Statement 
for Management" classifies the school section as a "private 
development subzone" and recognizes that "NPS can exercise little 
formal control over these lands". Moreover, the Park's Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for the General Management Plan 
classifies these lands for park development, with "[o]nly minor 
effects on the socioeconomic environment". See Appendix B of 
Addendum, attached to this brief. NPCA's assertion is unsupported 
by both the facts and the law. 
P. State Statutory Policies Do Not 
Abrogate Trust Obligations 
As trustee, the state is considered to be bound even 
closer by the bilateral covenant and imposition of trust duties 
than the federal government was in Utah v. Andrus. In Oklahoma 
Ed. Ass'n., Inc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982), the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that state statutes providing for low rental 
leases of trust lands and low interest mortgages to subsidize 
farming and ranching operations violated the state's trust duties 
and were unconstitutional. Regarding the impact of state statutes 
on the trust, the court ruled that: 
[n]o act of the legislature can 
validly alter, modify or 
diminish the State's duty as 
Trustee of the school land 
trust to administer it in a 
manner most beneficial to the 
trust estate and in a manner 
which obtains the maximum 
benefit in return from the use 
of trust property and the loan 
of trust funds. 
Id. at 236. 
In the Nigh case, as in the case now before the Court, 
it was argued that "considerations of waste and conservation enter 
into the situation and the attainment of a maximum return is not 
a controlling factor." Id. at 237. The court rejected this 
argument because it considered income to be the primary purpose 
of the trust, and ordered the Land Office to: 
Prudently exercise their duty to 
maintain maximum return to the trust 
estate from the trust properties under 
their control, subject of course, to 
the taking of necessary precautions for 
preservation of the trust estate. 
Nigh at 239. 
1. State Planning Statutes and Rules 
Do Not Conflict With Trust Duties 
NPCA asserts in its brief that the so-called "multiple 
use-sustained yield" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14, provides 
for protection of unique and significant lands of park quality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14 (1983, repealed and reenacted as § 65A-1-
2(3)(b), effective July 1, 1988. 1987 Utah Laws Ch. 121, §19) 
(Brief of Petitioner at 38). 
NPCA's misinterpretation of this is symptomatic of what 
has become one of the most basic disagreements between the 
parties. NPCA has consistently failed to distinguish between 
statutory enunciations of overall policies for general planning 
purposes, and particular administrative applications of that 
policy. NPCA's misreading of this general "multiple use-sustained 
yield" policy as requiring a particular administrative action, 
such as acting to preserve the scenic, aesthetic and recreational 
quality of a particular school section, indicates a basic 
misunderstanding about the role of planning and policy in the 
administration of state lands. 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14 provides in pertinent part 
that the "board shall determine the state policy and advise the 
on 
director on the management and control of all lands" and that 
"the board shall establish comprehensive land management policies 
for state lands using multiple use-sustained yield principles, 
consistent with school trust responsibilities" (emphasis added). 
The Division's position is that the reference in 
S 65-1-14 to "multiple use-sustained yield principles", when read 
together with other language in the section, is meant to guide the 
Board as it properly performs its general, overall policy function 
and develops general management plans. In addition, any such 
policy or plan would have to be consistent with the trust. This 
interpretation properly respects the Board's role as policy-
maker and advisor to the Director and the Division's role as 
administrator and trustee, and is consistent with Adkins v. 
Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 527. The limitation of 
the "multiple use-sustained yield" principles to the Board's 
planning responsibility has been made absolutely apparent with 
the repeal of § 65-1-14, and the enactment of the new Trust Land 
Management Act. Utah Code Ann. § 65A-l-2(3)(b) (effective July 1, 
1988. 1987 Utah Laws Ch. 121, § 19). 
Moreover, the Rules promulgated by the Board define 
"multiple use" and "sustained yield" only in terms of planning. 
Administrative Rule R632-1-2 (Addendum, Appendix C). 
NPCA's argument mistakenly takes legislative or Board 
enunciation of policy, meant only to apply prospectively and 
generically for future planning purposes, and uses it to address 
a particular claim and a specific situation, such as the 
preservation of a school trust section and prevent its 
disposal. 
2. The "Surface Policiesw Relied Upon by 
NPCA Was a Draft Document Superseded By 
Board Rules That Allowed This Exchange 
NPCA argues that the Division actions had to follow an 
articulated policy. NPCA has relied exclusively on a draft 
document that purports to codify prior enunciated board policy, 
prepared by the Division, entitled "Surface Policies, 1966 through 
December 1986" over more recent administrative rules. (Attached 
by NPCA to their brief as "supplemental materials"). There are 
several responses to NPCA's assertion that this document binds 
Division Administration. 
First, even if the "Surface Policies" had ever been 
adopted and were still effective, NPCA's quoted portion leaves off 
the admonition to "maintain the integrity of the trust" and 
"explore alternatives". This is exactly what the Director clearly 
did. (R. 31-36, 94-97). Second, under the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, such policies would have to be either "internal" 
(i.e. only effective between the Board or Division) or would be 
ineffective because they were "rules" that did not go through 
"rulemaking". 
Most importantly, Board rules that were in effect at 
the time of the exchange provide for maximum value to be sought 
for trust lands and specifically do not allow for protection of 
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"non-economic" uses. Administrative Rule R632-2-2 (1) (Addendum, 
Appendix C). 
3. Any Law or Policy that Infringes on 
Managerial Prerogatives for School 
Trust Lands That Reduce Value Are Invalid 
Utah state lands statutes and rules consistently 
contain the phrase "consistent with school trust responsibilities" 
out of a recognition of the overriding nature of the school land 
trust. As explained in a recent Montana Supreme Court decision: 
"any law or policy that infringes on the state's managerial 
prerogatives over school lands cannot be tolerated if it reduces 
the value of the land." Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 
702 P.2d 948, 954 (Mont. 1985)(title to water rights on state 
school land subject to trust)(emphasis added). Since the 
foundation for the school land trust lies in the enabling act and 
constitution, inconsistent statutes and rules must give way to the 
trust. 
6. School Trust Lands Are Not "Public Lands" 
and Cannot be Administered for 
Public Purposes and Interests 
NPCA refers throughout its brief to school trust lands 
as "public lands" and relies on cases that either deal with the 
"public trust doctrine", applicable only to state sovereign lands 
under navigable waters, or with federal "public lands". (E.g., 
Brief of Petitioner at 39-44). Not one authority dealing with 
school trust lands is cited in the over six pages of NPCA's brief 
dedicated to NPCA's assertion that there is a "common-law trust 
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obligation" to protect unique values which imposes a burden of 
specific justification for disposal decisions". (Brief of 
Petitioner at 38). This assertion is not only unsupported by any 
relevant authority in their brief, it goes straight against school 
trust case law. 
In United States v. Ervieny the United States Supreme 
Court considered a state plan to use school lands proceeds to 
promote development and tourism. As it struck the plan down, the 
Court noted that: 
Congress did not intend that the lands 
granted and confirmed should 
collectively constitute a general 
resource or asset like ordinary public 
lands held in trust for the people, or 
that the proceeds should constitute a 
fund like moneys raised by taxation 
for "general purposes". 
United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1917), affyd, 
251 U.S. 41 (1917)(emphasis added). 
A more recent case for the same proposition is Kanaly 
v. State, 368 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1985). In Kanaly, a state statute 
closed the University of South Dakota at Springfield and changed 
the college into a medium security prison. The court ruled that 
the statute violated the trust and was unconstitutional, and 
ordered that the fair market value of the college be paid to the 
appropriate trust fund. In its discussion of the relevant law, 
the court explained that the trust beneficiaries "do not include 
the general public, other governmental institutions, nor the 
general welfare of this state." Id. at 824, (emphasis added). 
A state court case as much on point to the facts at bar 
as the Andrus decision is State v. University of Alaska 624 P.2d 
807 (Alaska 1981). In that case, the Supreme Court of Alaska held 
that the statutory inclusion of state trust lands in a state park 
amounted to a breach of the trust created for the benefit of the 
University of Alaska and was unconstitutional. Id. at 813-14. 
Following Lassen, the court first found that a trust was created, 
and then applied standard trust law principles to find that the 
state had breached its trust. The court concluded that the 
inclusion of the lands in a park severely restricted the use that 
can be made of the land and was therefore incompatible with the 
grant because "the implied intent of the grant was to maximize the 
economic return from the land....rtThis intent cannot be 
accomplished if the use of the land is restricted to any 
significant degree." Id. at 813 (emphasis added). 
Like NPCA, the state argued that the grant for support 
of higher education was "no longer restricted to the narrow 
purpose envisioned by the enabling act" and that the lands: 
may be managed with multiple 
objectives in mind, some of which may 
be compatible with the support of the 
university and some which may not be 
compatible. It does not believe that 
the university must be compensated for 
placing the land in the park. 
Univ. of Alaska at 810 (emphasis added). 
The court found that the objective of park management 
was "incompatible with the objective of using the lands for the 
"exclusive use and benefit" of the university. JEd. at 813. 
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1. Neither the Constitution Nor Terms 
of the Trust Allow Administration 
For the Benefit of the Public 
NPCA argues in its brief (Brief of Petitioner at 44-45) 
that the reference to "public lands" in Article XX, Section 1, of 
the Utah Constitution allows the state to "use school lands in a 
broad public trust fashion, including nonrevenue uses", NPCA 
implies from this view that Article XX, § 1: "may actually be the 
appropriate basis for recognition of a broader "public trust" 
duty, at least requiring that Board decisions respect the public 
interest in unique noneconomic values on state school sections 
"whenever feasible". 
This is simply not the law. NPCA has cited no direct 
legal authority for this assertion and it goes far beyond the 
thesis and conclusions in the McCormack article which NPCA relies 
upon so heavily. W. McCormack, Land Use Planning and Management 
of State School Lands, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 525 (1982). Moreover, 
this interpretation denies the clear language of Article XX, 
Section 1, and overlooks every reference to the trust in the Utah 
Enabling Act and the Education Article (Article X), of the Utah 
Constitution. 
First, McCormack's law review article cites no case 
authority for the view that Article XX, Section 1 "could be read to 
grant the state flexibility to use school lands in a broad public trust 
fashion, including nonrevenue uses, so long as the lands are disposed 
17 
of "as may be provided by law". Supra at 532. 
17 
The cautious tone of many of Professor McCormack's conclusions 
is obvious. The Professor is in many instances merely suggesting 
possible, alternative views in order to suggest "flexible trust 
land management" could be adopted as a land use planning policy in 
new legislation. Supra at 547. 
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NPCA has overstated Professor McCormack's thesis and 
conclusions. The Director actually agrees with much of what 
Professor McCormack believes about the trustee's duty of prudent 
management for the protection of trust assets for the benefit of 
future trust beneficiaries, and that this may coincide with "non-
economic" land use. Supra at 534-535, 545-546. (R. 83-87 and 94-
97). Alsof McCormack faithfully looks to the purpose of the trust 
for support. See supra at 534-535. 
A central problem with NPCA's over-reliance on 
McCormack lies in their failure to draw the distinction between 
"disposition" and "planning". Brief of Respondent, supra. 
McCormack also recognizes the duties and discretion of 
the trust, and does not suggest that a flexible management 
approach must be adopted: 
Even if the state views its obligation 
narrowly to consist of obligation only to 
the schools, and not to the people at 
large, it still would owe a duty to use the 
assets wisely for future protection of the 
school system. Under certain 
circumstances, that might mean choosing to 
forego a proposed development project in 
favor of preserving trust assets for future 
generations of school students. It does 
not mean foregoing a proposed development 
project in every instance in which 
preservation may be ascertained to be a 
valuable interest. 
McCormack's "narrow" alternative dovetails nicely with 
the Director's conclusions about the Division's current obligation 
in the exchange: 
In summary, the State has a duty as trustee 
to manage and dispose of lands for the 
benefit of the public school system. To 
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the extent that preservation of non-
economic values does not constitute a 
diversion of trust assets or resources, 
such an activity may be prudently 
undertaken. To the extent that there exist 
several options for dealing with trust 
property and the protection of non-economic 
values is necessary for maximizing the 
economic value of the property, such 
protection may be prudently undertaken. 
When such preservation or protection 
results in a diversion of assets or loss of 
economic opportunity, a breach of duty is 
indicated. The provisions of Section 65-1-
14 must be read accordingly. 
(R. 89) 
IV. THE DIVISION PROPERLY RESPONDED 
TO NPCA PROCEDURAL REQUESTS 
A. The Division Properly Responded 
to NPCA'a "Petition to Intervene" 
In the Director's November 16, 1987 letter the Director 
explained that the main reason NPCA's request for "intervention 
or to otherwise participate" could not be approved as such was 
because the Division has "no procedures under which a request for 
intervention in the consideration of an exchange proposal might 
be granted." No Utah statute, rule or other legal basis in Utah 
law was provided by NPCA with its request. The Division also 
concluded that "consideration of an exchange application by the 
Division is not viewed as an adjudicative action under present 
law". The Division did not consider NPCA to have standing as a 
party as there was "no basis for interjection of a third party" 
into the exchange process. (R. 74, 75, 83) 
1. No Legal Basis Is Provided for a 
Request to Delay Division Action 
and NPCA's Actions Were Untimely 
Initially, although the Division saw no formal, 
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established procedure for participation by a so-called "petition 
for intervention" under current law, the Division did indicate 
that they would "welcome any information related to the value of 
the affected properties or any alternative which you may have to 
offer." NPCA was also urged to provide such information "as soon 
as possible ...." (emphasis added) (R. 74, 75) 
It is not the Division's fault that NPCA did not 
provide any additional information or data of any kind until 
after the consummation of the exchange. (R. 91). It was 
therefore impossible to respond to the request that the Division 
defer action. What was finally provided was merely an almost 
identical reiteration of previous legal argument. (R. 39-41, 
76-82) 
B. No Established Procedure Provides 
For Intervention In An Exchange of 
Land Grant Trust Lands 
The pivotal point upon which the determination of the 
intervention issue rests is whether there is any established 
procedure that provides for intervention in an exchange of school 
trust lands. Without any legal basis for approving intervention, 
the Division's action would be either without the Director's 
authority and "ultra vires", or would be solely within agency 
discretion. 
1. The Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act Does Not Apply to Relevant 
Board or Division Actions 
In its "petition for intervention", NPCA provided no 
authority of any kind to support its right to intervene. They 
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did reference in their brief the definition of "adjudicative 
proceeding", found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(a) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. (Brief of Petitioner at 25). 
Unfortunately, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act was not 
even effective until January lf 1988f which is clearly after the 
consummation of this exchange and all relevant actions. (R. 89) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22 (1987 Second Special Legislative 
Session). 
There are two equally compelling reasons that the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act is inapplicable. First, Section § 
63-46b-5(l)(G) of the Act specifically prohibits intervention in 
informal proceedings: 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more 
categories of adjudicative proceedings as informal 
adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by rule, 
prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative 
proceedings that include the following: 
... (G) Intervention is prohibited, except that the 
agency may enact rules permitting intervention where a 
federal statute or rule requires that a state permit 
intervention. 
Both the Board and the Division have enacted rules 
designating all categories of proceedings initially as informal 
proceedings to the extent that such may fall under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. State Lands and Forestry 
Administrative Rule R632-8-2 (effective January 1, 1988). 
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Second, even if the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act were effective, a 1987 amendment exempted real estate 
transactions from the section of the Act cited by NPCA. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2)(g) (1987). 
2. Neither the Board Nor Division Had Any 
Authority To Adjudicate NPCA's Claims 
The only case cited by NPCA in their brief in 
connection with their assertion of a right to intervene is Adkins 
v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah, 1986). In the 
part of the opinion dealing with administrative procedures, 
Adkins never even mentions intervention, and only ruled as to the 
nature of hearings held under Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-9. Adkins at 
528. 
Shortly after the Adkins case came down, however, 
subsection (2) of § 65-1-9 was amended as part of the Utah 
Judicial Article Implementation Act. (1986 Utah Laws, Ch. 47, 
§32). That amendment completely rewrote subsection two of 
§ 65-1-9, deleting all the language construed by Adkins as 
providing general adjudicatory authority, and apparently limited 
the subsection to judicial review for hearings held under 
18 
subsection (1) dealing only with "preference rights". 
Because the amendment to subsection (2) of § 65-1-9 came as 
part of the Judicial Article Implementation Act, and yet 
subsection (1) goes back almost to statehood, and because 
"preference rights" are such a small part of the Division's work, 
the limitation of subsection (2) to preference rights contests 
may have been a legislative error. Section 65-1-9 provided: (1) 
Where contests arise as to the preference rights of claimants for 
lands under control of the board, it has power to hold a 
hearing (2) Any party to the hearing may seek judicial review 
of the board's order by petition for de novo review filed with 
the district court....Review of the district court adjudication 
is by the Supreme Court". 
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This case is not a contest as to preference rights, and no 
administrative authority was provided for anything else. In 
addition, the Adkins Court searched all of Title 65 and was 
"unable to find any other reference in the Act that even hints" 
at providing adjudicatory authority. Adkins at 527. 
Of course, since the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
is now effective, there is at least some future authority for 
adjudication in the Division for those proceedings "commenced by 
or before any agency after December 31, 1987." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-22 (1987). 
V. THE DIVISION PROPERLY RESPONDED TO 
NPCA'B DECLARATORY RULING REQUESTS 
NPCA submitted nine requests for declaratory rulings 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15 (1985, repealed 1988). 
The Division Director found that NPCA had failed to provide 
sufficient information as to requests one through six, and failed 
to identify "statutes, rules or orders" as required by the 
statute for requests eight and nine. The Director only found 
sufficient information provided and response appropriate as to 
request seven. (R. 83-87) 
Initially, it should be noted that the Director 
informed NPCA that the Division "would be pleased to entertain 
any additional requests which provide adequate information. As 
an alternative, we would be pleased to respond in a non-
adjudicative setting to any questions concerning the subject 
matter addressed by the requests." (R. 84) NPCA declined to 
proffer additional information or take advantage of the 
Division's offer of an alternative to the declaratory ruling 
process. 
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NPCA asserts that the Director erred in his ruling 
and in not responding to the requests. Assuming for argument 
that NPCA's assertion is correct, it would not provide grounds 
the relief sought, i.e., rescission of the patent. Nothing in 
the declaratory rulings statute speaks to the relief available 
for erroneous rulings, other than that implicitly available for 
any administrative order. No relief is provided for a failure to 
respond promptly, or when there is a disagreement over whether 
there has been compliance with the terms of the statute and 
agency rules. 
The statute does, however, state that the declaratory 
ruling process has the "same status as agency decisions in cases 
disposed of by the agency after hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46a-15(1985, repealed effective April 25, 1988 by 1988 Utah Laws, 
Ch. 72, § 32). Thus, declaratory rulings are not intended to 
have the general applicability such as rules. Moreover, the 
declaratory ruling statute was not intended to "inhibit the 
exercise of agency discretion" specifically reserved by Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46a-3(8)(a) (1987). 
NPCA is trying to take an ameliorative statute that 
allows a party to obtain a ruling on an agency position, and 
twist it to find a remedy to stop the exchange. There is no such 
remedy provided in § 63-46a-15, even for those who first properly 
comply with the statute. 
VI. THE BOARD DID NOT EXCEED ITS STATUTORY 
ROLE OR INTERFERE IN DIVISION ACTIONS 
NPCA's only argument proffered in their brief for their 
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assertion that the Board exceeded its authority and was overly 
involved in the Division's decision is that "the only decision 
reflected in the record is that of the Board, rather than the 
Division." (Brief of Petitioner at 52). 
This is patently untrue. At pages 88-90 of the record, 
are the minutes of the Director's meeting wherein the exchange 
was approved—with no Board involvement at all indicated. In 
addition, all correspondence, all analysis of appraisals and 
other issues and any negotiation was done by the Division, not 
the Board. In particular, the Director's December 2, 1987 status 
report to the Board shows clearly that the distinctions in agency 
roles were respected. (R. 92-93) 
Moreover, the Board decision was completely contingent, 
and merely approved the Division's recommendation. (R. 48, 53) 
In fact, the final terms of the exchange had little in common 
with that presented to the Board, three and half months earlier. 
The Division even rejected Garfield County's initial proposal, 
without first seeking permission or advice from the Board. 
The mere fact that the Board allowed the public to 
participate at its meeting when the Division presented the 
analysis of the application did not make the Board's action 
adjudicatory. By the Board's freely allowing public comment, and 
the fact that the Division took advantage of this meeting to 
solicit comment, the public interest was better served in the 
process. 
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Although the Board's role is essentially that of 
policy-maker, it also had a duty to "advise the Director on the 
direction, management and control" of state lands. Utah Code 
Ann. § 65-1-14. Without the Division's presentation before the 
Board, the Board could not perform its advisory function. 
Assuming for argument that the Board's action did 
exceed its powers and was adjudicatory, then, following Adkins, 
it would be "mere surplusage", and not grounds for rescission of 
a patent. Adkins at 527. 
A. NPCA Had Notice of And An Opportunity 
Appear At the Board Meeting 
NPCA alleges that its representative did not have 
adequate notice of the Board meeting and access to information, 
and first became aware of the exchange through review of the 
agenda of the Resource Development Coordinating Committee. 
(Brief of Petitioner at 14) As explained in this brief's 
Statement of the Case, the RDCC meeting jLs the first stage that 
agency actions have for public notice and input. The record 
demonstrates a level and pattern of participation in this matter 
by NPCA that exceeds that of any other group. The record 
contains a September 7, 1987 letter from NPCA's representative 
to the Director, and the Board minutes contain almost a verbatim 
rendition of NPCA's comments to the Board and Division at the 
September 11, 1987 meeting. 
While NPCA also says that it did not receive the 
Division analysis memorandum until the day before the hearing, 
that could be because it was not ready for release until the 
meeting. Notice for Board and Division meetings met and exceeded 
the public notice requirement of the Open and Public Meetings 
Act. Utah Code Ann. S 52-4-6(3)(a) and (b) (1977, amended 1978). 
B. The Director of the Division Published 
Adequate Findings and Conclusions 
in Support of the Exchange Approval 
Although the Director approved the exchange at his 
December 21, 1987 regular meeting, that same day he issued a 
press release with an attached three-page, single-spaced 
"Statement on the Exchange of Land". (R. 94-97) (Appendix A) 
Although the Division has no standard form on which it issues 
written decisions, to the extent that an exchange of school trust 
lands requires findings and conclusions, this document would 
easily exceed that requirement. 
In it, the Director discusses the nature and duties of 
the trust, the details of the proposed exchange, the public 
comment and consideration of non-economic values in state land 
exchanges. As to this last topic, the Director concluded that 
the state "can affirmatively act to preserve and protect [non-
economic] values only if there is a net economic benefit to the 
school trust that will be realized by such protection." (R. 97) 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, and because 
NPCA lacks standing, the petition for review should be 
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dismissed. If the Court does find that it has jurisdiction and 
NPCA has standing, then this Court should find the exchange to 
be consistent with the trust terms and duties and a proper 
administrative exercise of the trustee's discretion• The Court 
should further find that there were no procedural infirmities 
with the Division's actions, that the Division properly responded 
to NPCA's requests, and the Board did not exceed its statutory 
role. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this*~> 1 S^day of October, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. CHRISTENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE RECORD 
APPENDIX B: EXCERPTS FROM THE CAPITOL REEF GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND STATEMENT FOR MANAGEMENT 
APPENDIX C: RELEVANT STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS AND RULES 
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE RECORD 
Roger Peart, Chairman 
Patrick 0. Spurgin, Director 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY 
MINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING OF THE 
UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS I FORESTRY 
DATE: 
PLACE: 
ATTENDING: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 1987 
MOAB, UTAH 
BOARD 
Roger Peart 
Douglas Bates 
Calvin Black 
James Bowns 
Willard Gardner 
Frank Nishiguchi 
Loryn Ross 
Chandler P. St. John 
Max Williams 
STAFF 
Patrick D. Spurgin 
Richard Klason 
Donald G. Prince 
Keyin Carter 
Stan Baker 
John Lestlna 
Marilyn Pratt 
Kurt Higgins 
Mike Grosjean 
Louis Brown 
Lynda Belnap 
OTHERS IN ATTENDANCE 
Richard Mitchell, Department of Natural Resources 
Dotti Brockbank, Public Affairs, Department of Natural Resources 
James E. Easterly 
Phyllis Easterly 
Donald R. Bauman 
Terri Martin, National Parks and Conservation Association 
Norman Henderson, National Park Service, Capitol Reef National Park 
Noel R. Poe, National Park Service, Capitol Reef National Park 
William K. Dinehart, Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst 
Mack Helm, Shriners 
Lloyd A. Scharf 
Gary Oviatt 
Tom Hatch, Garfield County Commission 
Sherill Ott, Garfield County Commission 
Mike Medberry, The Wilderness Society 
Greg Kemp, C.P.A., Bloomington Ridge Development 
Brooks Pace, Bloomington Ridge Development 
Paul S. Rattle 
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JL EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County 
Garfield County seeks to exchange certain county-owned property for a State 
school section. The lands Involved are as follows: 
State lands: 
Township 34 South, Range 8 East, SLM. 
Section 16: All, containing 640.00 acres, School Fund. 
County-Offered lands: 
Township 36 South, Range 3 West, SLM. 
Section 5: NW4 (except airport), N2SW4 
Section 6: W2NE4, NW4SE4 (except airport) 
Township 34 South, Range 2 West. SLM. 
Section 26: NE4NW4 
The County-owned lands Include several non-contiguous parcels. The State 
section sought by Garfield County is among lands addressed by the Board in 
directing the Division to pursue the exchange of school sections entrapped 
within national parks and military reservations at Its June meeting. The 
State section 1s also addressed by a May 19, 1967, Memorandum of Understanding 
executed by Governor Bangerter and Secretary of the Interior Hodel. The MOU-
provides a general administrative framework for the removal of State sections 
from national parks and military reservations through Federal land Policy and 
Management Act exchange procedures. 
To facilitate the MOU exchange, the Board withdrew lands within the pertinent 
national parks and reservations*from leasing. However, the Board's action did 
not address the processing of exchange applications for the lands otherwise 
withdrawn from leasing. In addition, the Garfield County exchange application 
was received by the Division prior to the Board's action to withdraw the lands 
Included in National Parks. 
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IL EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3.. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
An economic analysis of this exchanges is as follows: 
1. Comparison of the appraised value of selected and offered lands: Garfield 
County has submitted two appraisals for the lands involved in the exchange; 
one appraisal for the state section and one appraisal for county lands in the 
Johns Valley area. Both appraisals were completed by the same appraiser. The 
appraisals show value of the lands identified to be approximately equal in 
value: 
640 acres state land 3 $100/AC « $64,000 
380 acres county land G 9200/AC * 576,000 
The appraiser discounted the county land by $10,000 due to the fact that a 
certain unknown amount of the county land is taken up by the Bryce Canyon 
Airport facilities and runway, resulting in a value of (66,000. 
2. Economic potential comparison (i.e. the degree to which there is a 
reasonable assurance that the county land will provide income in excess of the 
school section): A portion of the subject state section located along the 
Burr Trail 1s presently leased by Ivan Lyman of Boulder, Utah, 6P 20555. The 
leased portion, 240 acres, is included with other sections which total 1,040 
acres. The number of AUMs on the entire 1,040 acres is 52. That Indicates 
each acre provides about .05 AUM or about 20 acres per AUM. At the current 
rate, the entire section returns 516.80 each year. This section has little 
potential for any use other than grazing. 
The offered lands have little use other than grazing. Some distant 
opportunity may exist for some development adjacent to the airport or some 
agriculture use of the offered properties near Widtsoe Junction. However, 
that development potential use may be more speculative than real. The 
agriculture potential would depend upon the availability of water. The 
grazing Income would differ between the selected and offered parcel since the 
entire offered parcel could be grazed. The difference however would not be 
significant since the offered 320 acres at {.06/acre (the usual grazing permit 
fee for the area) 1s not substantially more than the 240 acres presently 
leased at J.07/acre. 
lb 
9/11/87 
Page Mo. 20 
Page No. 21 
JL EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
3. Likelihood of greater revenue flowing to the trust from the sale of the 
section: The opportunity may_ exist with this section like the sections In 
Tooele Co. on the Ford; Bacon & Davis sale. I.e., some big dollars may be 
spent by various groups to secure this section of land because of Its impact 
and location In the park and along the Burr Trail (switchbacks). However, it 
could conceivably also be sold privately to Garfield County if 1t would be 
used for a public purpose. If it could be sold privately at the appraised 
value of $100/acre, the state would receive 564,000 dollars which at a 
conservative rate of 7% return would yield $4,480 in interest each year. This 
Is considerably more than we could expect to receive from grazing fees and 
possible lease fees on the county land if It were to be developed in the near 
future. If this can be expected on a private sale, then it is reasonable to 
expect at least that on a public sale and possibly much more. This does not 
account for benefits to other state land management initiatives from 
exchanges. The liklihood of greater revenue is therefore not clear. 
4. Likelihood of greater revenue from leasing the section: The section has 
no potential for leasing other than limited grazing. It is located within the 
boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park and development is difficult under 
these conditions. This section has been withdrawn from lease application 
because of its involvement in the in-holding exchange. 
Other analyses of the proposal are: 
1. Garfield County Application 
The Board has a fiduciary duty to the common school beneficiaries. This 
duty includes: 
a) a duty to seek full value in the disposal of trust property. 
b) a duty of loyalty, I.e., the Board must strive to benefit the trust 
beneficiaries and may not have, as it's purpose, the benefit of a third party 
(particularly when no net benefit Is realized by trust); and 
c) a duty to prudently seek benefits which are reasonably probable and not 
speculative. 
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h . EXCHANGES ' SALES (CONT'D) 
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
As a practical natter, with the exception of exchanges such as the WOU 
exchange,- land exchanges have been at the Initiative of parties outside of the 
Board or Division or have been offered as an alternative to outside parties' 
sale or lease applications. Accordingly, exchanges almost always arise due 
to, and are motivated prlmarilj ty, benefits sought by an outside party. 
There is therefore a credible argument that an exchange of value for equal 
value 1s a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty unless some other net 
benefit is realized by the trust U tte exchange. 
The legislature has indicated a value-for-equal-value exchange may be. 
acceptable when scattered state lands are consolidated. Presumably, the 
legislature views consolidation as offering net management or other benefits. 
The Garfield County application would rtmIt in the removal of some non-State 
inholdings from a larger State land block. Under some circumstances, this 
could provide some management benefits. These management benefits Include: 
reduction of boundary problems, contiguous land ownership for project 
planning, reducing number of land owners involved in the management planning 
process, and obtaining potentially more productive land. The possibility of 
these benefits being realized as a result of the exchange may be likely if the 
land is actively managed for purposes of income production or is suitable for 
such management. However, the true likelihood of income is rendered 
moderately speculative because the current economic activity in the vicinity 
and the uncertainty of Increased economic activity in the foreseeable future. 
Unless there is a basis for greater management investment for the State lands 
and offered land, no benefits of consolidation will be realized. 
Consolidation is not the only potential benefit that may be realized. If 
there was a reasonable likelihood that an exchange would, in fact, increase 
trust income in the judgment.of a prudent person, then an exchange may be 
justified. From a grazing perspective, the difference In revenue is of 
Questionable significance. See 6-2 above. Other economic potential 1s as 
noted earlier, dependent on market conditions which are currently not 
encouraging. 
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£ i EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
As noted above, the Board and the Ofvision have an obligation to obtain full 
value. If greater value can be realized by sale or lease and such a sale or 
lease is reasonably probable, an exchange nay be a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Assuming a sale at fair-market value, the sale.analysis in B-3 above would 
indicate that selling the property would return more to the trust than would 
an equal value exchange or lease. However, the Garfield County Commission has 
indicated its willingness to identify additional property for exchange to 
assure that clear benefits are derived by the trust, above and beyond an 
equal-value exchange. 
2. Relationship to the MOU Exchange. 
Because the same lands would be affected by the Garfield County exchange (or 
any sale option) and the MOU exchange, It is important to be aware of the 
potential consequences of the MOU exchange. The Bangerter/Hodel MOU is based 
on the assumed benefits of removal and consolidation of state inholdings from 
federal reserved lands. However, the trust principles applicable to the 
Garfield County exchange are also applicable to the MOU exchange. 
FLPMA requires value for equal value exchanges, but trust duties suggest that 
from the trust perspective some additional, non-speculative benefit to the 
trust must be realized. Also as noted, benefits must be maximized. So long 
as benefits of the MOU exchange are assumed, they do not support the 
completion of the exchange. Until selected lands t r t finally identified, 1t 
is difficult for the Board to determine whether the MOU is ultimately 
consistent with trust duties. In fact, it will be well into the BLM 
evaluation process before the true feasibility of the exchange of many of the 
selected lands will be clear. 
Accordingly, the status of the MOU exchange, even if it is assumed to conflict 
with the Garfield County exchange, does not presently provide a basis for 
denying the application submitted by the county. In communications between 
the Governor and the Secretary, the Secretary has indicated that based on the 
assumption that the county ultimately intends to transfer the land to the 
National Park Service, there 1s no significant conflict between the exchange 
with Garfield County and the Inholdings exchange. 
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JL. EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
3. Relationship to other Potential Transactions 
The State had Identified lands for quantity and deficiency selection 1n the 
general vicinity of Section 16. Certain of these lands abut the Burr Trail 
north of Bullfrog. Those lands have not been transferred to the State due to 
the pending National Wildlife Federation lawsuit. If the lands are passed to 
the State and if, as a result of the County's application, the Burr Trail Is 
paved or otherwise Improved, the value of those selected lands could be 
increased. 
Comments through RDCC were received from the National Park Service Regional 
Manager, the Division of Parks and Recreation, and State History. The NPS 
feels that the exchange would disrupt or destroy park values, but has provided 
no substantiation of these remarks other than noting that upgrading the Burr 
Trail would lead to Increased vehicle traffic. The NPS Regional office also 
stated its view that there would be a clear conflict between the exchange and 
the MOU. 
Parks and Recreation's comments stress that the Board's decision should focus 
on the County's proposed use and ask rhetrocially whether it is appropriate 
for the County to own lands within the Park. State History notes the presence 
of a rock art site. No additional Information was provided. Comments have, 
also been received from the National Parks and Conservation Association, and 
the Wilderness Society. 
The appraised value of the tracts involved would indicate that the county land 
and State land have approximately equal fair-market value. There is no clear 
indication that the State school trust will realize financial benefits without 
Modification of the application. 
The Staff suggests the following alternatives: 
1. Approve the requested exchange with the County. 
2. Determine whether the County desires to obtain Section 16 for a public 
purpose and offer a private sale accordingly. 
3. Offer Section 16 at public sale. 
4. Approve the concept of an exchange subject to further evaiuatfon to assure 
that there is a benefit to be realized from the County exchange. 
5. Defer action until it 1s clear that benefits to the trust would be 
realized. 
1h 
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L . EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
The Staff recommends approval of Alternative No. 4. 
The equal-value exchange 1s an Insufficient basis for approving the 
application as submitted. Private sale and public sale do not assure that 
either Income will be maximized or that opportunity costs would be 
justifiable. Private sale may prevent effective control by the County and 
would only provide appraised value. Public sale would be potentially In 
conflict with the existing understanding concerning ultimate transfer to the 
National Park Service. Deferring action provides no Incentive to the 
applicant to offer more valuable lands or lana with higher economic potential 
and presents unnecessary procedural hurdles to the ultimate decision on the 
application. 
The Director explained that because of the relationship between this, the MOU, 
and other Initiatives between the Governor and the Secretary of the Interior 
and because this Section 16 1s land within the MOU, we wanted to assure that 
there was an understanding of the consequences in terms of policy 1f the 
exchange were to be undertaken. The Governor recently had a telephone 
conversation with the Secretary. In that conversation, the Secretary stated 
he saw no policy conflict with this proposal with the assumption that 1t 1s 
Garfield County's ultimate desire or goal to turn this land over to the 
National Park Service. Since there seems to be no problem based on the 
Secretary's communication, we are faced with the basic question of whether or 
not the exchange application from Garfield county Is consistent with our trust 
obligation. This Includes the economic analysis of the proposal. 
Mr. Brown, of the Staff, stated that Garfield County has submitted two 
appraisals. The values on the State section were $100 per acre. The County 
land was appraised at $200 per acre and discounted $10,000 overall because of 
the airstrip running through the property. The appraisals of the land appear 
to be basically equal. Mr. Black, of the Board, asked If the appraiser 
discounted the State Section 16 because of the road right of way. The Staff 
Indicated he did not. The State land was appraised as fee simple unencumbered 
land. The State section 1s leased, 1n part, for grazing. The County land 
would be leasable for grazing. For It to be utilized, 1t would have to be 
fenced. There might be some long-term use of the land 1n John's Valley for 
agriculture. Public sale of the State section 16 1s difficult because the 
Secretary's communication assumed that the land, by some means, would 
ultimately get Into the control of the Park Service. Private sale holds some 
question as to whether the County could transfer to the Park Service. 
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L. EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
This exchange application was submitted to R.D.C.C. Comments were received 
from the National Parks Service Regional Office, State History, and State 
Parks. No other comments were received through that process. Since that 
time, we have received comments from the Wilderness Society and the National 
Parks and Conservation Association. 
Noel Poe, Chief of Resource Management, and Norman Henderson, Resource Manager 
from Capitol Reef National Park, appeared before the Board. They indicated 
the Superintendent of the Park was unable to attend today. Mr. Poe stated 
that the National Park Service protests the transfer of ownership of this 
State Section 16 to Garfield County. Their objections are based on the 
following. 
First, if the land in question were to become County-owned, they feel the next 
step would be for the land to be developed by the County. Any commercial 
development along that road would be unacceptable and could hamper the 
development of the Parks. The National Park Service also feels that the MOU 
transfer would remove any other potential land use conflicts in the area. If 
the State were to transfer this particular section to the County, they feel it 
would not be in keeping with the intent of the MOU. They had not yet heard 
that the Secretary of Interior had indicated he had no problem with 1t. They 
have been trying to validate this Information. As of this morning, they were 
told by their Regional Office that there still Is a conflict. If the transfer 
Is recommended, then they recommend that the Division complete an EIA prior to 
the exchange. 
Mr. Ross, of the Board, stated that he understands that Garfield County would 
give the land to the Park Service and wondered why the Park Service would 
oppose that. Mr. Poe stated that this morning he talked with the Garfield 
County Commissioners, and that was the first time they have approached the 
National Park Service to tell them of the approach they wish to use to get the 
land Into Park Service ownership. The National Park Service feels the MOU Is 
the route to go to accomplish this. The Chairman asked 1f it changed their 
position to know they would eventually receive the land back. Mr. Henderson 
stated that, 1f the land 1s In Garfield County's ownership, It is not under 
the Antiquities Act, etc.; and this concerned them. 
The Board did note that the State has been trying to get out of parks for 
years, but the valuation of the lands within the park has been a problem. 
They indicated that they hoped the Park Service remembered how valuable they 
feel the land Is when we go to exchange out of the other inholdings. 
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iL EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3;. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
Mr* Black stated the National Park Service has talked about reducing conflict 
between agencies. He suggested this is a two-way street. He feels there has 
been little support on the part of the Federal Government 1n the past. This 
shows a lack of the spirit of cooperation. They need to become sensitive to 
the needs of the State and counties where these lands are located. Mr. Poe 
stated that at least the staff at Capitol Reef is excited about the 
possibility of clearing up the issues of the State lands within National 
parks. Their Regional office has brought up the question to the Bureau of 
Land Management of valuation of these lands. They are working on a process to 
deal with valuation. 
Mr. Bill Dinehart, of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst's Office, stated that 
Garfield County is still a part of the State and is subject to laws that 
govern other State agencies as to what type of activity would or could occur 
on the Section 16. 
Mr. Henderson, of the Park Service, stated the NPS has never stated they are 
against the paving of the Burr Trail. If the land is not transferred 
Immediately to NPS, the land becomes valuable and could be transferred to 
private ownership. Things could change. There 1s no assurance that the land 
would go to National Park Service ownership. 
Mr. Williams, of the Board, stated that whether or not the land would change 
hands is a strong issue. This should tell the NPS that the State wants and 
needs more cooperation in dealing with lands in National parks. The Park 
Service 1s willing to receive the lands, but the Park Service has not been the 
ones to give up the lands in trade. It has been BLM. Because of that, there 
has not been a concerted effort to move forward. The MOU is able to take care 
of this. He indicated he is glad the Governor is willing to let this issue 
come to the Board in recognition that this may work in helping to serve the 
needs of the State and the counties in getting out of the parks. This also 
shows that there Is value In these lands. This gives us an opportunity to 
show Interior that we should get the value for these lands that is there. Mr. 
Williams felt the Board, by resolution, should dedicate the lands to Garfield 
County with the stipulation that lands would be transferred to the County for 
• specific purpose of transferring them to the National Park Service and that 
the MOU would move ahead as otherwise outlined. 
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i L EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D) 
3. Exchange No. 188 » Garfield County (cont'd) 
Mr. NIshlgucM, of the Board, stated that he takes objection to the attitude 
of the Park Service which Indicates that, when something Is privatized, 1t 
will not be taken care of. He feels there is comparable use In the 
privatization of lands, and that could be done In a very acceptable manner. 
There could be orderly development no matter where the land Is. He also feels 
that for the Board to put any kind of an encumbrance on the exchange with 
Garfield County would not be legal. He feels the National parks should be 
enjoyed by all, not just those who can backpack Into them. There needs to be 
a re-evaluation of who they are serving, not just what they are doing. 
Ms. Terri Martin, on behalf of the National Parks and Conservation 
Association, appeared. She indicated they are a non-profit organization that 
is established to watchdog National park issues and are here today to make a 
formal protest to this application and represent many people of the 
organization. She submitted a letter to the Board which stated their six main 
concerns. These are briefly as follows: 
1. The transfer could lead to significant harm to the important scenic and 
natural values for which Capitol Reef National Park was established, which are 
of great importance in preserving Utah's image as a National park "destination 
state". Failure to protect and preserve an area so obviously critical to the 
character and quality of this major National Park would do serious damage to 
Utah's reputation. 
2. The proposed transfer would violate the spirit and purpose of the MOU 
signed by the Secretary of the Interior and Governor Bangerter. The MOU was 
signed as a recognition that one major Inducement for the exchange 1s to 
permit consolidation of National park holdings and assure protection of the 
parks, as well as to enhance the State's ability to manage State sections to 
better serve Its trust obligations. They feel acting on this proposal would 
have a very good chance of jeopardizing the MOU. 
3. They feel ft Is doubtful that the Garfield County proposal offers the 
State the highest values available for the State section in question. The 
main point 1s that they don't really know until there have been appraisals. 
Acting on the application prior to completing an analysis of land values under 
the MOU and comparing them to these values would be a possible violation of 
the Board's trust responsibilities. 
4. There are serious questions about the basis for the appraisal completed 
for Garfield County's proposed exchange. They have not had the Appraisal 
professionally reviewed, but there appears to be a couple of areas that seem 
to be arbitrary. 
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3. Exchange No. 188 » 6arf1e1d County (cont'd) 
5. They question the authority of the Board to take action on this exchange. 
The Adklns' case requires that the Board act solely as the policy-making body, 
while the Director Is required to make decisions on administrative natters. 
€. They believe the approval or further consideration of the exchange would 
be inconsistent with the policy adopted by the Board regarding the management 
of sensitive areas. They feel there has not been a complete analysis done on 
all the alternatives. 
Ms. Martin stated they are also concerned about the procedure under which this 
was considered. They feel there has been failure to give adequate notice to 
the public for Its opportunity to provide comments. They also feel that 
approval of this application could have serious effect on the Governor's 
reputation to the citizens of the State who have concern for the sensitive 
areas of the State. 
Mr. Bates, of the Board, stated that Utah 1s an Important destination State; 
and Garfield County has tried to provide access to attractive points of 
Interest. People won't go where they can't get access to these site. Ms. 
Martin Indicated their concern is not with the road, but only the transfer of 
the land.' 
Mr. Mike Medberry, representing the Wilderness Society, appeared and stated 
that, if the land In question 1s to go to the Park Service, It doesn't seem 
that an Intermediary 1s necessary. The proposal would conflict with several 
areas, Including the spirit of the MOU and the Governor's Inholding exchange. 
He Indicated that, while the State Is Interested in trading land It owns 
within National parks, Garfield.County Is proposing to acquire land within 
Capitol Reef. It Is difficult to imagine that the Board would approve 
Garfield County's proposal without recognizing that such an approval could 
make the Governor's exchange difficult to accomplish. Mr. Medberry stated 
that, 1n an article 1n the Salt Lake Tribune of September 3, It was noted that 
the land could be used as leverage for authorizing the freeing-up of the money 
for paving the Burr Trail. He felt that Is an outrageous statement. Mr. 
Medberry asks that the Board not approve the proposal for Garfield County to 
exchange this land. 
Mr. Bates, of the Board, asked If the Wilderness Society was willing to go to 
the people In Congress who are blocking the appropriated monies and get them 
released. Garfield County has been ytry up-front with their proposal of why 
they want these lands. They only want to get the road paved. 
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3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd) 
Mr. Williams, of the Board, stated that Ms. Martin and Mr. Medberry have 
expressed some valid concerns that the land might not be transferred to the 
National Park Service. He stated that the representation that the Board has 
from Garfield County Is that the land would be transferred. The Board feels 
this 1s actually what would happen. If that 1s stipulated 1n the exchange, he 
doesn't see any reasons to challenge It. 
Mr. Tom Hatch, of the Garfield County Commission, stated they had only a 
couple of points to make. The airport lands are fenced. The 380 acres that 
1s proposed to be exchanged 1s already contiguous to a larger State land 
block. They ask for the support of the Board in approving this exchange. 
The Director noted that the Staff's recommendation Is that the exchange be 
approved as to concept subject to further evaluation of the County's offer to 
ensure that the value of the trust for the exchange 1s better that equal value. 
St. John / Bates. Unanimously approved. 
"I move we approve the Staff's recommendation." 
Meeting adjourned at 12:35 p.m. 
ROGER p£AftT, CHAIRMAN 
lb 
9/11/87 
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December 21, 1987 
Mr. Chris Wangsgard 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 1600 
50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Dear Mr. Wangsgard: 
In two letters dated October 16, 1987, the National Parks and Conservation 
Association (NPCA) (1) petitioned for "intervention in pending proceedings" 
relative to the exchange of State lands entrapped within Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area for land offered by Garfield County and (2) requested several 
declaratory rulings. The Division responded to the Petition for Intervention 
in an earlier letter, noting that the exchange 1s not an adjudicative proceed-
ing for which intervention is appropriate under current law. Nonetheless, the 
Division invited the NPCA to provide additional Information it felt relevant 
to the values Involved in the proposed exchange. 
In response to NPCA's request for declaratory rulings, please note that, 1n 
accordance with Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46a-3(8)(a), Section 63-46a-15 is 
not intended to inhibit the exercise of agency discretion within the limits 
prescribed by statute or rule. Accordingly, both the provisions of Section 
63-46a-15 and R632-7 are to be read in a manner that does not unduly restrict 
the discretion of the Division. Section 65-46a-15 contemplates an 
adjudicative process, the result of which has the same status as agency deci-
sions jln cases disposed of by an agency after hearing. Section 63-46a-15 1s 
not an alternative to rulemaking. Accordingly, It Is not considered to pro-
vide for rulings of general applicability. 
Pursuant to Section 65-46a-15, the Board of State Lands and Forestry has 
promulgated Rule R632-7. Section R632-7-4 specifies requirements for the 
petition form. Included in the section is a requirement for the description 
of the need or reason for the applicability review. Requirements for state-
vents of reasons or need for a declaratory ruling relate to the adjudicative 
nature of a declaratory ruling and the statutory implication that a circum-
stance under which a declaratory ruling Is appropriate 1s essentially the same 
as a case adjudicated by an agency. This underscores the concept that 
declaratory rulings are not intended by the legislature to be of general 
applicability. Accordingly, declaratory rulings must focus on the rights, 
status, or legal relationships of Identified individuals. Petitioners must 
provide Information that establishes the relationship between the request for 
a declaratory ruling and their legally cognizable Interests. 
NermwiH lw«mrr I 
Grwrnar 1 
DoCKtnini I 
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With respect to the requests identified in your letter as Nos. 1 - 6 , the NPCA 
has provided inadequate information to assure that responses to the requests 
are necessary to protect or preserve NPCA's rights, status, or legal 
relationships. For Request No's. 1 and 2, NCPA indicates no relationship 
between any particular interest and the allocation of responsibilities between 
the Board and Division of State Lands and Forestry. Similarly, for Request 
No's. 3, 4, and 5, NCPA indicates no relationship between any particular 
Interest and appraisement responsibilities. For Request No. 6, NPCA states no 
relationship between land management policy documentation requirements and any 
particular interest. 
No declaratory rulings on these requests can be responsibly provided on the 
basis of the information submitted. We would be pleased to entertain any 
additional requests which provide adequate information. As an alternative, we 
would be pleased to respond in a non-adjudicative setting to any questions 
concerning the subject matter addressed by the requests. 
Requests Nos. 8 and 9 in NPCA's letter refer to "policies- in the Division's 
"Surface Policies" document. The Division has no "Surface Policy" document 
providing for either management of sensitive areas or environmental 
assessments. In the past, the Division has attempted to compile an organized 
collection of statements reflecting Board actions. This compilation was never 
finalized. Presumably, Requests Nos. 8 and 9 refer to this draft 
compilation. This draft document has not been authorized by either the 
Division or the Board in accordance with the Administrative Rulemaking Act or 
any other law and is not binding on either the Board or Division. 
Accordingly, there is no basis for a declaratory ruling with respect to the 
applicability of provisions of the unapproved compilation. 
Section 63-46a-15 and Rule 632-7 refer to the determination of the appli-
cability of statutes, rules, or orders. Assuming there were a final "Surface 
Policy" document as referred in NPCA's request, these policies would be 
neither statutes, rules, or orders and, accordingly, would not be subject to 
declaratory ruling requirements. 
With respect to request No. 7, the NPCA asserts substantial Interests without 
specifying what those interests are. However, with the accompanying Petition 
for Intervention, the NPCA asserts with some particularity those injuries It 
fears will be associated with the proposed land exchange. Thus, although the 
form of the petition Is not In strict compliance with Rule R632-7-4, NPCA has 
provided adequate Information relative to NPCA's stake in the resolution to 
«llow a review of applicability to some extent. 
NPCA states "Many of Its members use and enjoy Capitol Reef National park 
for hiking, birdwatcMng, camping, scenic, aesthetic, and other personal or 
recreational pursuits. NPCA also represents the views of other Americans who 
use and enjoy the national parks by actively advocating the preservation of 
national park resources In an unimpaired state." 
Mr. Chris Wangsgard 
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*• • • The State parcel that Garfield County seeks to acquire, located 
entirely within the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park, has long been 
recognized as an area of unique scenic beauty, pristine character, and primi-
tive recreational quality. The proposed transfer, however, If approved, would 
permit Garfield County to attempt commercial or other development of the Park 
section. Any such development within Capitol Reef National Park will substan-
tially Injure the Park's unimpaired quality and result in direct Injury to 
NPCA members and others who use and enjoy the Park. • ." 
These statements Indicate the NPCA Interest 1n the preservation or destruction 
of scenic, aesthetic, and recreational values It speculates could result from 
an exchange. This 1s the case even though the Information concerning the 
effect of an exchange on NPCA's Interests are founded upon untested 
assumptions. Principally, NPCA assumes that the possibilities for development 
by Garfield County are fundamentally different from or better than 
possibilities for State-sponsored development. This Is not clearly the case. 
Nonetheless, the relationships between the feared Impacts and NPCA's proferred 
Interests 1s sufficiently articulated to enable a limited ruling. 
NPCA asks for a ruling as to whether, under 65-1-14 and other applicable 
statutes, constitutional provisions, rules, or policy decisions by the Board 
or Division may give preference to the protection of Identified non-economic 
values. 
Rule 632-7 requires the Identification of the statute, rule, or order for 
which applicability review 1s requested. NPCA has only Identified Section 
65-1-14 in accordance with this rule. No declaratory ruling concerning 
unspecified statutes, constitutional provisions, rules, or orders will be made 
except as deemed necessary to determine the applicability of Section 65-1-14. 
Section 65-1-14 addresses, 1n relevant part: 
(1) The assignment of policy-making responsibility to the Board and direction, 
management, and control of certain State lands to the Division. These lands 
include land granted to the State by the Federal government (trust lands) and 
submerged lands to which the State Is entitled (sovereign lands). 
(2) The "establishment of comprehensive land management policies using 
au1t1p1e-use/susta1ned-y1e1d principles, consistent with school trust respon-
sibilities.* 
(3) The sale or lease of State land in the best Interest of the State 1n 
Accordance with the law. 
(4) The reservation of coal and other mineral lands from sale. 
Mr. Chris Wangsgard 
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(5) The setting aside of the beds of lakes and streams to which the State 1s 
entitled for park and recreation purposes. 
(6) The definitions of "multiple-use" and "sustained yield". 
Section 65-1-14 provides no express requirement for giving preference to the 
protection of scenic, aesthetic, or recreational values in the management of 
the section of land sought by Garfield County, although there 1s express 
consideration of similar values with respect to sovereign lands. Likewise, 
this Section provides no express prohibition of such a preference. Conse-
quently, propriety of giving such a preference or the prohibition of such 
depends on whether it may be inferred to be permissible under Section 
65-1-14. 
The section of land sought by Garfield County was granted to the State in 
accordance with Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act. This section provides 
that the section in question is "hereby granted to said State for the support 
of common schools." This grant of Section 16 was accepted pursuant to 
Article XX of the Utah Constitution. Article XX provides that all lands of 
the State that have been or may hereafter be granted to the State by Congress 
are hereby accepted . . . and shall be held in trust for the people, to be 
disposed of as may be provided by law for the respective purposes for which 
they have been or may be granted. . ." (emphasis added). Therefore, Section 
16 is held in trust to be disposed of as provided by law for the support of 
the common schools. 
The Constitution of the State does not specify standards applicable to trustee 
actions on behalf of beneficiary Institutions, except with respect to the 
management of the proceeds from sale and resource exploitation under Article 
X, Section 5, of the Constitution. Nonetheless, because the land Is a trust 
asset, land management actions must be consistent with trust duty. 
Accordingly, the Board and the Division have treated the management of land as 
subject to the same fiduciary duties as those applicable to the funds. 
Duties of trustees are focused on the cestui que trust and the fulfillment of 
the settlor's intent. Accordingly, the land in question is managed for the 
support of the common schools. A trustee's loyalty to the trust beneficiary 
must be undivided. Objectives of support of the public schools should not be 
subordinated to the pursuit of other values on the land impressed with the 
trust. (See Informal Attorney General's Opinion 85-62.) 
It follows that provisions of Section 65-1-14 may not be read as producing 
such a subordination. Section 65-1-14, in relationship to the school trust, 
must be interpreted and applied consistently with the trustee's duty of 
loyalty. The requirement for "establishment of comprehensive land management 
policies using mu1tip1e-use/susta1ned-yield principles* suggests that the 
nanagement and use of scenic, aesthetic, and recreational resources on State 
land might be granted status equal to economic considerations 1n regard to the 
particular Section 16, based on the statutory definition of 
Mr. Chris Vangsgard 
Page Five 
December 21, 1987 
multlple-use/sustalned-yleld. However, taking Into account "trust responsi-
bilities" discussed above, management policies for school lands are obliged to 
operate within a framework of economic advantage to the beneficiaries of the 
trust. Provisions of the Section 65-1-14 for the sale or lease of lands and 
reservation of mineral estates reflect the legislature's disposition to 
realize economic advantage from trust lands. 
Because the beneficiary of the trust 1s actually an "open class", the trustee 
has an obligation to conserve trust asset value so as to assure that present 
members of the class are not unduly benefited at expense of future members. 
To the extent that trust asset value correlates with non-economic values, the 
trustee may prudently conserve non-economic values. Without this correlation, 
affirmative expenditure of trust resources to conserve non-
economic values Indicates a breach of duty. 
The State and its trust officers cannot prudently expend trust resources to 
preserve values that do not provide economic advantage. Scenic, aesthetic, 
and recreational values may, In some instances, provide economic benefit to 
the beneficiaries. In fact, there have reportedly been several Instances 1n 
which an opportunity for economic development of State land plainly depended 
upon the protection of what are otherwise considered to be non-economic 
values. However, when there 1s a choice between two actions, both of which 
provide some measure of economic benefit to beneficiaries of the school trust, 
a prudent trustee must balance the risk of each choice in light of the antici-
pated benefit. If the trustee determines, in the reasonable exercise of Its 
discretion, that greater economic benefit would likely flow from activities 
dependent upon the preservation of scenic, aesthetic, and recreational 
resources, the trustee would have dear authority to preserve those values. 
On the other hand, If the trustee determines that other choices provide 
greater economic advantage, then the preservation of those values at the 
expense of economic benefit from other options indicates a breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
In summary, the State has a duty as trustee to manage and dispose of lands for 
the benefit of the public school system. To the extent that preser- vation of 
non-economic values does not constitute a diversion of trust assets or 
resources, such an activity nay be prudently undertaken. To the extent that 
there exist several options for dealing with trust property and the protection 
of non-economic values 1s necessary for maximizing the economic value of the 
property, such protection nay be prudently undertaken. When such preservation 
or protection results 1n a diversion of assets or loss of economic 
opportunity, a breach of duty 1s Indicated. The provisions of Section 65-1-14 
oust be read accordingly. 
Aftr/lk 
DECEMBER 21, 1987 
THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF STATE LANDS & FORESTRY TOOK FORMAL 
ACTION ON DECEMBER 21. 1967 AT 9:30 A.M. IN THE DIVISION OF STATE LANDS & 
FORESTRY OFFICE. 355 WEST NORTH TEMPLE. 3 TRIAD CENTER. SUITE 400, SALT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH 84180-1204. ON THE BELOW LISTED MINERAL AND SURFACE BUSINESS 
MATTERS AS INDICATED. 
• * * . 
MINERAL LEASE APPLICATIONS 
METALLIFEROUS MINERAL LEASE APPLICATIONS - APPROVED VEoC^ 
to/appr 
w 
Upon recommendation of Mr. Mansfield, the D1rec  app oved the Metalliferous 
Minerals lease applications listed below at a rental of $1.00 per acre per 
annum; royalty as provided In the lease form approved by the Board of State 
Lands. The applications have been checked by the Mineral Division and found 
to be In order. The land status has been examined and the lands found to be 
open and available. The reassessment for these leases will be January 1, 1998. 
Mln. Lease Appl. No. 43730 
James D. McDowell 
136 North California Ave 
Industry. CA 91744 
M1n. Lease Appl. flu 43731 
James D. McDowell 
136 North California Ave 
Industry, CA 91744 
Mln. Lease Appl. No. 43732 
Millard S. Jensen 
720 E Three Fount 
Murray. UT 84107 
Due $1.00 
Mln. Lease Appl. No. 43733 
Eugene Myers 
160 North 300 Mest 
Washington, Utah 84780 
TBS, 
Sec. 
17 s. 
Sec. 
T13N 
R3W, 
2: 
R3W, 
36: 
SLBiM. 
All 
SLB&M. 
NX 
. R1SW. SLB&M. 
Utah 
658.83 acres 
Utah 
320.00 acres 
Box Elder 
:. 2: Lots 1, 2. 3. 4, SXNX 320.96 acres 
T28S. R9H. SLB&M. 
Sec. 32: All 
Beaver 
640.00 acres 
12/21/67 W W . • 
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GARFIELD COUNTY EXCHANGE 1 8 8 / ^ 5 / 
At the September 1987 Board meeting, " Board approved the concept of 
exchanging State land described as: 
T34S. R8E. SLB&M 
Sec. 16 (Burr Trail) 640 acres N/L 
Garfield County 
to Garfield County for land located at the Bryce Canyon Airport 
V*11»y ripirrthed as: 
T36S. R3K, •iinr.M 
Sec. 5: NH4 (except that portion contained In the N2SW4 airport rui"»>," 
Sec. 6: K2NE4 (except that portion contained in the N2SW4 airport 
runway) and NH4SE4 
T34S. R2W, SLB&H 
Sec. 28: NE4NW4 
Sec. 15: SXSW5SSW2 363.03 acres H/L 
Garfield County 
The appraisals submitted on these parcels of land Indicated that they are 
equal In value. In dealing with past exchanges, the Board has engaged In a 
practice of requiring at least 1251 of value on exchanges. Garfield County 
was contacted by letter of November 3, 1987, requesting that they submit 
additional land or other land equal to 150X of appraised value of the State 
property. The county has now submitted additional land located In the 
Richfield City Industrial Park described as Lots 24 and 25 containing 3.03 
acres with an appraised value of $33,500. This value added to the $65,000 
value for the Johns Valley and Bryce Canyon Airport property would be 151.51 
of value exchange. 
$65,000 • $35,000 • $98. County Property 
$65.000 appraised value State Property 
$98.5O0/$65.OO0 - 1M « 
Staff has reviewed all the submitted appraisals and consider them satisfactory 
In accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards. 
Based on the above, the staff recommends that the Director approve the 
exchange to Garfield County. 
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January I1;1. 1988 
Mr. Chrb Wangsgard 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 1600 
50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
We have received your letter of December 18, 1987, in which you request (1) 
that prior to any approval of the exchange between the State and 6arfie1d 
County, NPCA be provided with responses to declaratory ruling requests with 
reasonable opportunity thereafter to proffer factual submissions or legal 
argument in opposition to the exchange and (2) that before any approval of the 
exchange, the Division address and state 'the basis for resolution of several 
stated issues. 
By letter dated December 21, 1987, we responded preliminarily to eight of the 
nine requests for declaratory rulings and responded finally to one of the 
requests. Upon receipt of additional information, as Indicated In our earlier 
letter, we will be pleased to consider the development of the declaratory 
ruling on the other questions. 
With respect to the Inquiries 1n your December 18 letter, it 1s not possible 
to honor your request for discussions of the various Issues raised prior to 
the exchange approval. The request, although dated December 18, 1987, was not 
received until December 24, 1987, which was three days after the approval of 
the exchange. 
Please feel free to contt irther assistance. 
FDS/lb 
cc: David S. Chrlstensen 
Terrl Martin 
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S I i i I E U > IE S 1 FORESTRY DIVISION OKAYS GARFIELD COUNTY EXCHANGE 
( f State Lands * w« c u r ^ 
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concept i t s September board meeting in Moab, I, Itah At that meeting, the boat d 
r r i r n ^e publiw on * : roposed exchange. 
After ver i f i ca t ion the state »e an exchar d 
Count v. 
# # I . w -
For further information contact: 
Dott i Brockbank 
Public Af fa i rs 
538-5508 
STATEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF LAND BETWEEN 
RELATED TO THE SWITCHBACKS SECTION OF THE BURR TRAIL 
On December 21, 1987, the Director of the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry approved the exchange of State land entrapped within the boundaries 
of Capitol Reef National Park for certain lands offered by Garfield County. 
Authority for the approval of the exchange Is based on Utah Code Annotated 
Section 65-1-2.1, which provides that "the Division of State Lands shall be 
the State land authority", and Section 65-1-3.1, which establishes the 
Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry as the Executive head of 
the Division. 
In addition to being within Capitol Reef National Park, the State land to 
be exchanged In accordance with the approval straddles the switchback portion 
of the Burr Trail as It crosses Water Pocket Fold. The difficulties 
associated with managing school trust land within national parks and the 
disputes over the appropriateness of Improvements to the Burr Trail have 
aroused considerable public Interest In these lands. This statement Is 
offered to assist Interested parties In understanding the policy framework
 L 
the processes leading to the December 21 approval. 
In 1894 Congress made a decision which has significantly affected State 
land-management choices. In that year Congress granted to the State certain 
lands for the support of the common schools. This Federal grant, made with 
certain conditions stated In the Utah Enabling Act, was accepted by the State 
in the State Constitution ratified In 1896. The courts have characterized 
this grant and acceptance as creating a "solemn agreement" or "Irrevocable 
compact." These acts by the State and Congress reflect a commitment then and 
now of State and Federal resources to the support of public education. 
The courts have also regularly characterized this solemn agreement 
between the Federal Government and the State as a legal trust In which State 
land and proceeds from the disposal of State land constitute the body of the 
trust. In keeping with the characterization, the State Is viewed as trustee 
and the public school system Is viewed as the beneficiary. 
Trustees bear several duties to beneficiaries. The duties Include a duty 
of loyalty to the beneficiary and a duty to nake trust property productive and 
profitable. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly noted the applicability of 
the profit votive to State land Management In a 1965 decision. In addition, a 
trustee has a duty to assure that profitability is not exhausted at the 
txpense of future beneficiaries. 
Hlth respect to the duty of loyalty, a trustee Is obliged to act first 
and foremost for the beneficiary In disposing of trust property* Of course. 
P.. 96 
In a business transaction, such as a ..... exchange, the party with whom a 
trustee deals presumably Is also seeking certain benefits. Otherwise, that 
second party would have no Incentive to go through with the transaction. 
XL. The Garfield County Exchange 
The Garfield County Exchange must be considered in light of trustee 
duty. Because of the location of the State section within Capitol Reef 
National Park, many types of economic development of the property are pre-
cluded for all practical purposes. The State, as trustee, must determine on 
the basis of economic potential whether to retain, sell, or exchange the 
land. To the extent that an exchange provides an opportunity for Improving 
the position of the beneficiary through acquisition of land with greater near-
or long-term economic potential, the State has sought to exchange entrapped 
lands with the federal government and others. 
The Governor and the Secretary of Interior have been exploring means of 
changing land-ownership patterns for the mutual advancement of State and 
Federal objectives. When Garfield County proposed the exchange, the Governor 
discussed with the Secretary of Interior the possfbfHty that such an exchange 
would Interfere with larger-scale exchange discussions between the State and 
the Federal Government. The Secretary indicated to the Governor that the 
exchange with Garfield County would not result In any significant Impediment 
to other Federal exchange options. 
Accordingly, the State negotiated '" Garfield County and agreed to an 
exchange which, since there was no 1ntt •/•ience with the larger-scale 
exchanges. Increases the economic value ot the State school trust land by 50 
percent on the basis of land appraisals. At the same time, the exchange 
results In the removal of State trust land from within Capitol Reef National 
Park, thereby Increasing the options for economic use of the State-acquired 
lands. 
U l i Public Responses to the Exchange 
The exchange has occurred after considerable public discussion of the 
process and policy covering such exchanges. The proposed exchange was first 
discussed in a meeting of the Resource Development Coordinating Committee 
(RDCC). The RDCC Is established under Utah Code Annotated Section 63-2Ba-' ^ 
cejj to assure coordinated review of State agency actions which nay affect 
physical resources within the State. RDCC review also provides an opportunity 
for interested members of the public to comment on the proposed actions. 
After the RDCC review of the proposal, tne exchc .cussed 
extensively at the September, 1987, meeting of the Bo :e Lands and 
Forestry. At that meeting, members of the public were again provided an 
opportunity to make statements with respect to the proposed exchange. 
Representatives of the National Parks and Conservation Association and the 
Wilderness Society made statements In both written and oral form Indicating 
their dissatisfaction with the proposal and the policy framework within which 
the exchange was to be constructed. 
R. 97 
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After consideration of comments received from government agencies and the 
public, the Board of State Lands and Forestry approved the concept of the 
exchange In accordance with U s policymaking and advisory responsibility under 
law. This approval was subject to the assurance that the State school trust 
would receive appropriate economic advantages from the exchange. During the 
subsequent negotiations between the Division of State Lands and Forestry and 
Garfield County, additional opportunity was provided to parties expressing 
Interest in those negotiations to provide information related to the 
appropriateness of the valuation serving as the basis for the exchange. No 
additional Information was provided; and, on the basis of negotiations between 
the County and the Division and verification of the appraised values, the 
exchange was approved. 
IV. Consideration of Non-economic Values In State Land Exchanges 
Many people believe that management principles applicable to Federal 
public lands are also applicable to State lands. This view Is relatively 
accurate with respect to certain State lands. However, as noted In the 
discussion In Section I above, school trust lands are committed to the 
specific purpose of providing support for the public school system. 
The majority of comments received from the public with respect to the 
Garfield County Exchange reflected a concern about the protection of 
non-economic values they believe exist on the land within Capitol Reef 
National Park. Indeed, Capitol Reef National Park was established to protect 
and preserve certain values. However, Congress chose to not provide for the 
protection of those values on the former State section. It did so by not 
changing the school trust status of the land Involved. 
Therefore, while there may be certain non-economic values on the land, 
the State can affirmatively act to preserve and protect those values only If 
there Is a net economic benefit to the school trust that will be realized by 
such protection. In accordance with trust duties, the State cannot unduly 
speculate that such conditions are present; and no Information has been 
presented to Indicate that the conditions are In fact there. On the contrary, 
current Information compels the conclusion that failure to proceed with an 
exchange which would result In an Increase In the value of the State trust 
land Inventory (as Is the case with the lands offered by Garfield County) 
would be a breach of trust duty. 
APPENDIX B: EXCERPTS FROM THE CAPITOL REEF GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND STATEMENT FOR MANAGEMENT 

*• State School Sections 
The KPS can exercise little formal control over these 
lands and, potentially, uses of the lands could occur 
that would have a negative impact on adjoining 
parklands. Due to their isolation and interspersion 
with federally-owned lands, the State is also limited 
in its ability to manage these school sections. There 
is no mineral activity taking place within these 
sections. 
The NPS would like to eventually acquire all the 
State's surface and mineral interests through exchange 
for other (BLM) land, probably in several smaller 
exchanges, as it would be extremely difficult to put 
together one exchange package under the regular FLPKA 
(Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976) exchange 
procedures which would include all the StateTs 
ownerships. 
Currently, there are four commercial oil, gas, and/or 
coal leases in force on these school sections, as well 
as numerous grazing leases. 
2. Private Property 
In the last several decades, the KPS has acquired-
almost all of the privately-owned lands within the 
boundary. A small 0.42-acre parcel, nestled In a low, 
wet area of Fruita, remains unacquired. NPS envisions 
no action on this single parcel as long as the status 
quo is maintained. Should the 22 owners unanimously 
decide to sell or donate their interest they should be 
accommodated, if funds are available. It seems likely 
that, due to the complexities of this multiple 
ownership, a "friendly condemnation suit*' to clear 
title may be necessary If a protective interest is to 
be acquired in this tract. 
3. Life Estate 
The Service purchased the Sleeping Rainbow Ranch 
several years ago, but Mr. and Mrs. Lurton Knee retain 
a right of "lifetime use and occupancy" on 13.13 acres 
near Pleasant Creak. 
4. Trends 
The park Is virtually surrounded by federally-owned 
lands administered either by the BLM or the U.S. Forest 
Service. Some private properties do abut or lie near 
u 
V. MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 
This listing of objectives does not preempt the long 
term General Management Flan (valid through 2001) but 
charts shorter-range targets for park management. 
A. Through research, secure an adequate data base and 
in-depth understanding of the park's cultural and 
natural resources in order to chart credible, 
long-range management actions to insure resource 
protection and perpetuation. 
B. Regardless of the present scarcity of resource data 
and professional research, prepare and implement 
practical, short-term operating plans to catalog, 
protect, and interpret park resources on the basis of 
the best available information. 
C. Enhance visitor use and enjoyment of the park by 
the early introduction of new visitor use programs and 
facilities—in accordance with the approved General 
Management Plan--as follows: 
1. Headquarters District—add Fruita Loop Trail, 
Fremont Canyon Trail and the Goosenecks Road; expand 
and upgrade visitor center facilities; increase 
interpretation of historic and aboriginal occupations 
of Fremont River Valley; and improve sanitary 
facilities at Pleasant Creek. 
S 2. South District—provide guided tour material; add 
small parking areas at Burro, Five Mile, and Cottonwood 
Washes along with trailhead orientation; and add a 
10-site primitive campground at Upper Burr Trail. 
3. Worth District—provide wayside exhibits at Gypsum 
Sinkhole and Glass Mountain; mark hiking, routes to 
Jailhouse Rock, Wall of Jericho, Middle Point, and 
Temples of the Sun and Moon; provide small parking 
areas at these locations; and provide a 10-site camping 
area. 
D. Provide reliable, 24-hour-per-day visitor access to 
all emergency services. Including an upgrade in present 
obsolete communications link with county ambulance 
services. 
£. Secure sufficient control over land within the park 
boundary to ensure effective management and protection 
of the resource, including those lands known as the 
State school sections. 
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CAPITOL REEF 
NATIONAL PARK / UTAH 
SUMMARY 
This general management plan/final environmental impact statement 
addresses the following issues: 
Management strategies for preserving the resources and providing 
for public use at Capitol Reef National Park 
National Park Service recommended general management plan for 
Capitol Reef National Park 
Proposals for five boundary adjustments at Capitol Reef National 
Park 
Five alternatives, including the no action and preferred alternatives, are 
described and evaluated in this document. The present management 
strategy and development level would remain essentially unchanged in the 
no action alternative. Alternative 2 would retain the existing management 
strategy and development level, with an emphasis on providing additional 
hiking and interpretive opportunities. 
Alternative 3 would propose expanding visitor use facilities primarily in 
the Headquarters District of the park. Alternative 4 would emphasize an 
increase in visitor opportunities and facilities on a parkwide basis. 
The preferred alternative is a combination of different elements from the 
preceding alternatives and constitutes the National Park Service's general 
management plan. Proposals for management zoning, resources 
management, visitor use and interpretation, general development, and 
boundary adjustments are included. 
Four major zones are designated in the proposed management zoning for 
the park: natural, historic, park development, and Special use. The 
majority of the park lands are zoned natural, which places management 
emphasis on the conservation of natural resources and processes. 
The principal consideration in natural resources management will be to 
protect and preserve the natural environment for the enjoyment of park 
visitors and for the integrity of the ecosystems. The National Park 
Service will provide for the preservation, restoration, protection, 
interpretation, study, management, and use of all significant cultural 
resources through adequate research and programming. 
The major focus of visitor use will continue to be in the Headquarters 
District, with only primitive or minor developments provided in the South 
•nd North districts. The primary objective of interpretation will be to 
txpiain the significance of the7 Waterpocket Fold as a prime geologic 
structure, as well as an influence on human use of the arid land in this 
area. 
The general development proposed has been phased so that increased 
development will occur only after the attainment of certain Juncture 
points. The maximum development proposed will include expansion of the 
visitor center and associated administrative facilities (maintenance, 
housing), expansion of the campground and its utility systems, and 
addition of a walking loop trail in Fruita. Trails and a small horse camp 
will be provided at Pleasant Creek. Development in the South Oistrict 
will include a ranger station, a campground, utility and employee housing 
areas, and a new road to the Strike Valley viewpoint. Additional trails 
will be available in both the South and North districts. It is conceivable 
that some of the Juncture points would not be reached in the lifetime of 
the general management plan, resulting in only minimal or no development 
vof associated facilities. 
The boundary adjustment proposed would be the deletion of 1,400 acres, 
placing the park boundary at the base of the Circle Cliffs, and the 
addition of 300 acres at Glass Mountain. 
Implementation of the preferred alternative will result in a net change of 
impact on soils and vegetation of 26.5 acres over existing use. There 
will be no significant long-term impacts on wildlife or air quality. The 
expansion of visitor services will increase water demand and result in the 
release of more wastewater to the watershed. A flood-monitoring system 
and emergency flood response and evacuation plan will be developed to 
mitigate the potential adverse effects due to flooding. The development 
of new park facilities will result in a visual intrusion on the natural and 
historic settings. 
Increased visitor use could adversely affect archeological sites, resulting 
in destruction or damage to these resources. Sensitive planning and 
design of facility expansions will reduce the impact on historic resources 
in the Fremont/Fruita Archeological/Historic District. 
Only minor effects on the socioeconomic environment will result from 
implementation of the preferred alternative. 
implementation of the preferred alternative will increase recreational and 
interpretive opportunities, improve visitor safety, and reduce congestion 
at Capitol Reef National-Park. 
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APPENDIX C: RELEVANT STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS AND RULES 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Enabling Act# S6i 
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, sections 
numbered two, sixteenf thirty-two, and thirty-six in every 
township of said proposed state, and where such sections, or any 
parts thereof have been sold or otherwise disposed of by or under 
the authority of any Act of Congress, other lands equivalent 
thereto, in legal subdivision of not less than one quarter 
section and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of 
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said State for the 
support of common schools.... 
Utah Enabling Act, 510s 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational 
purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall 
constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only 
shall be expended for the support of said schools, and such land 
shall not be subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any 
other entry under the land laws of the United States, whether . 
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for school purposes 
only. 
Utah Enabling Act, Article Z, $5* 
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of Congress, 
approved February 21st, 1855, for the establishment of the 
University of Utah, and of all the lands granted by an Act of 
Congress, approved July 16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent 
funds, to be safely invested and held by the State; and the 
income thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and 
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges, 
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and conditions 
of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was amended, effective 
July 1, 1987, with Section 5 becoming Sections 5 and 7.) 
Utah Constitution, Article XX, fit 
All lands of the State that have been, or nay hereafter be 
granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, 
grant or devise, from any person or corporation, or that may 
otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared to be 
the public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the 
people, to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the 
respective purposes for which they have been or may be granted, 
donated, devised or otherwise acquired. 
Utah Code Annotated, $ 65A-1-1. 
As used in this titles 
(1) "Board" means the Board of State 
Lands and Forestry. 
(2) "Division" means the Division of 
State Lands and Forestry. 
(3) "Multiple use" means the 
management of various surface and subsurface 
resources so they are utilized in the 
combination that will best meet the present 
and future needs of the people of this 
state. 
(4) "Public trust assets" means those 
lands and resources, including sovereign 
lands, administered by the division that cure 
not part of the school or institutional 
trust lands. 
(5) "School and institutional trust 
lands" means those properties granted by the 
United States in the Utah Enabling Act to 
the state of Utah in trust and other lands 
transferred to the trust, which must be 
managed for the benefit oft 
(a) the public school system; or 
(b) the institutions of the state 
which are designated by the Utah 
Enabling Act. 
(6) "Sovereign lands" means those 
lands lying below the ordinary high water 
mark of navigable bodies of water at the 
date of statehood and owned by the state by 
virtue of its sovereignty. 
(7) "State lands" means all lands 
administered under the authority of the 
board and the division. 
(8) "Sustained yield" means the 
achievement and maintenance of high level 
annual or periodic output of the various 
renewable resources of land without 
impairment of the productivity of the land* 
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Utah Code Annotated, S 65A-1-2. 
(1) The Board of State Lands and Forestry is created 
within the Department of Natural Resources. The board is the 
policymaking body for the Division of State Lands and Forestry. 
The board shall establish policy fort 
(a) the management of school and 
institutional trust lands and sovereign 
lands; and 
(b) fire and forestry management 
responsibilities as prescribed in Chapter 8, 
Title 65A. 
(2) Policies shall be consistent with the provisions 
of the Utah Enabling Act, the Utah Constitution, and state law. 
The board shall adopt rules under the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act necessary to fulfill the purposes of this title. 
shalls 
(3) In carrying out its responsibilities the board 
(a) use reasonable care to make the 
school and institutional trust property 
productive of income in the best interests 
of the school and institutional trusts; 
(b) insure that state lands are 
administered under comprehensive land 
management policies using multiple use-
sustained yield principles consistent with 
the respective school and institutional or 
public trust responsibilities; 
(c) insure that at least fair market 
value is received for the use, sale, or 
exchange of school and institutional trust 
assets; and 
(d) insure that the public trust assets 
are administered in the best interest of the 
state. 
Utah Code Annotated, S 65A-1-4. 
(1) The Division of State Lands and Forestry is 
created within the Department of Natural Resources under the 
administration and general supervision of the executive director 
of the department and under the policy direction of the Board of 
State Lands and Forestry. The division shall be the executive 
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authority for the management of the school and institutional 
trust lands, sovereign lands, and the state's mineral estates, 
and shall provide for forestry and fire control activities on 
state and private lands as required in Section 65A-8-1. 
Utah Code Annotated, $ 65A-1-7. 
(1) The board shall make rules governing practice 
and procedure in adjudication of individual rights and 
responsibilities. These rules shall ensure procedural due 
process. 
(2) Upon the petition of an aggrieved party to a 
division action, the board may review division actions and issue 
an order modifying or rescinding division action inconsistent 
with statutes, rules, or board policy. 
(3) A qualified hearing examiner may be appointed for 
purposes of taking evidence and making recommendations for a 
declaratory order. The board shall consider the recommendations 
of the examiner in making decisions. 
(4) Any party to an agency order may seek review of 
the order. 
(5) Reconsideration of final agency action and 
judicial review of final agency action shall be governed by 
Chapter 46b, Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act. 
Utah Code Annotated, S 65A-2-2. 
Management plans shall be developed for natural and 
cultural resources on lands. The division may request other 
state agencies to generate technical data or other management 
support services for the development and implementation of state 
land management plans. 
Utah Code Annotated, S 65A-7-7. 
(1) In accordance with board rules, state lands may be 
exchanged for other land or other assets of equal value within 
the state held by other proprietors. Upon request of the 
division, the governor is authorized to execute and deliver the 
necessary patents to other proprietors and receive proper deeds 
of the lands so exchanged. No exchange will be made by the 
division until a deed or patent for the land received in exchange 
has been issued by the proprietors. 
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Utah Code Annotated, S 65-1*70 
In order to compact, as far as practicable, the land 
holdings of the state, the Division of State Lands is hereby 
authorized to exchange any of the land held by the state for 
other land of equal value within the state held by other 
proprietors; and upon request of the division, the governor is 
hereby authorized to execute and deliver the necessary patents to 
such other proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of the 
lands so exchanged; provided, that no exchange shall be made by 
the division until a patent for the land so received in exchange 
shall have been issued to such proprietors of [or] their 
grantors. 
Where the state lands are encumbered by an existing 
lease, the division, upon approval of an exchange, may with the 
consent of the lessee terminate the existing lease and issue a 
lease of the same type, without regard to provisions of § 65-1-
45, on lands of comparable acreage or value which may be acquired 
in the same exchange in which the leased lands are used as base. 
Upon acceptance of exchanged lands, the state shall honor all 
vested rights. 
Utah Code Annotated, S 65-1-9 (effective until 7/1/1988) 
(1) Where contests arise as to the preference rightsrof 
claimants for lands under the control of the board, it has the 
power to hold a hearing and to direct the taking of evidence 
concerning questions involved, which hearing shall be reported in 
full. The board shall make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, enter its order and notify the parties to the hearing of its 
findings, conclusions and order. 
(2) Any party to the hearing may seek judicial review of 
the board's order by petition for de novo review filed with the 
district court within 30 days of the entry and notice of the 
board's order. Review of the district court adjudication is by 
the Supreme Court. 
Utah Administrative Code, 1987-1988, R632-1-2. Definitions 
MULTIPLE USEi the management of various surface and sub-surface 
resources so that they are utilised in the combination that will 
best meet the present and future needs of the people of this 
state consistent with the school and institutional trust 
responsibilities. 
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS: those properties granted 
by the United States in the Utah Enabling Act to the state of 
Utah in trust, or other properties transferred to the trust, to 
be managed for the benefit of the public school system and the 
various institutions of the state in whose behalf the lands were 
granted. 
SOVEREIGN LANDS: those lands lying below the ordinary high water 
mark of navigable bodies of water at the date of statehood and 
owned by the state by virtue of its sovereignty or land received 
in exchange for sovereign lands. 
STATE LANDS: all lands under the authority of the Board of State 
Lands and Forestry. 
SUSTAINED YIELD: the achievement and maintenance of maximum non-
depleting level of annual or periodic production of the various 
renewable resources of land without impairment of the 
productivity of the land. 
Utah Administrative Code, 1987-1988, R632-2. State Land 
Management Objectives 
R632-2-2. Management Objectives 
The general management objective for state lands is to 
provide for the maximum utilization of the natural resources 
consistent with multiple use-sustained yield principles and 
proper resource management practices. Coincident with this 
general objective, the division and board seek to: 
1. obtain the greatest possible monetary return for 
the school and institutional trusts consistent with sound 
management practices to which such land is assigned. 
2. manage school and institutional trust lands for 
their highest and best use. 
3. perpetuate the renewable natural resources on state 
lands using conservation practices. 
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Utah Code Annotated S 65-1-14i 
The Board of State Lands shall 
determine the state policy and advise 
the director on the directionf 
management and control of state lands 
heretofore or hereafter granted to this 
state by the United States Government, 
or others, and of lands lying below the 
water's edge of any lake or stream to 
the bed of which the state is entitled, 
for any and all purposes whatsoever, 
except lands used or set apart for 
public purposes or occupied by public 
buildings; provided, that the board 
shall establish comprehensive land 
management policies for state lands 
using multiple use-sustained yield 
principles, consistent with school trust 
responsibilities. . • . 
The board, with the approval of the 
executive director of natural resources, 
and the governor may set apart for 
public park or recreational use any part 
of the lands claimed by the state as the 
beds of lakes or streams and may 
delegate the duty and authority to 
manage the surface of lands so set apart 
to the division of parks and recreation, 
the division of wildlife resources or 
other appropriate state agency. . . . 
For the purposes of this title, 
multiple use means the management of 
various surface and subsurface resources 
so that they are utilised in the 
combination that will best meet the 
present and future needs of the people 
of Utah. Sustained yield means the 
achievement and maintenance of high-
level annual or regular periodic output 
of the various renewable resources of 
land without impairment of the 
productivity of the land. In the 
development of comprehensive land 
management policies, the board shall 
consider stewardship management 
programs. 
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Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-22 
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, 
and judicial review contained in this chapter are applicable to 
all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before an 
agency on and after January 1, 1988. 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency 
review, and judicial review that are in effect on December 31, 
1987, govern all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or 
before an agency on or before December 31, 1987, even if those 
proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on 
January 1, 1988. 
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